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This thesis considers the social welfare administration legislation that 
was passed during the presidential administration of Lyndon Johnson, and 
whether this legislation has successfully accomplished the eradication of 
poverty in the United States. It is concluded that poverty remains a 
persistent problem in the United States. Reasons for the persistence of 
poverty are considered and major private and public alternatives to present 
poverty relief programs are examined.
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Section 1: Goals for which the War on Poverty was Begun
In January of 1964, President Lyndon Johnson spoke these now-famous 
words in his inaugural address: "And this Administration today, here and
now, declares unconditional war on poverty in America....The Richest nation 
on earth can afford to win it....We cannot afford to lose it....Our aim is 
not only to relieve the symptoms of poverty, but to cure it, and, above all 
to prevent it." Johnson's goal was to end poverty in America by the coming 
June, and, at that time, to close forever the chapter on poverty in 
America.
Today, it is 25 years since Johnson declared war on Poverty.1 
Poverty still exists in America. America faces a huge budget deficit, 
unlike any in prior history. The War on Poverty continues, unabated, to 
draw funds from the public trough. Has this war accomplished what it was 
declared for? What was Lyndon Johnson's motivation for declaring the war 
in the first place? To answer these questions, and to evaluate their 
answers, it is necessary first to understand the environment in which 
Johnson operated.
The 1960s, prior to the ravages of the Vietnam War, was a culmination 
of decades of progress in America. It was a time of extreme optimism 
toward and confidence in the roles of government and social institutions to 
harness progress and make the citizens of the United States better off. 
Charles Murray, a student of social change, writes, "Apart from the 
idiosyncratic influences of Johnson's ego and skills, a fundamental shift 
in the assumptions about social policy was occurring. Four forces pushed 
it: The economists seemed to have found the secret of lasting prosperity;
policymakers and intellectuals discovered structural poverty; the civil 
rights movement moved north; and the original antipoverty programs failed
to show the expected results.... In only three years, from 1964 to the end 
of 1967... social policy went from the dream of ending the dole to the 
institution of permanent income transfers that embraced not only the 
recipients of the dole but large new segments of the American 
population..." (Murray 1984, 24-26).
What Johnson, and John Kennedy before him, faced was a country 
steeped in economic progress, not the Rooseveltian depression that had 
sparked earlier changes in social welfare administration. Poverty, in the 
1960s, was on the decline due to the relative economic freedom that had 
allowed individuals to harness new technology and expand production, which 
in turn raised the standard of living for the whole country. In light of 
this progress, and in deference to the poverty which still existed, 
politicians sought to redefine poverty and the management of poverty 
according to the changing view of the role of the state. Theodore Lowi 
writes, "...a search for an entirely new concept of welfare was initiated 
in the early 1960s. The conclusion of this search was the new welfare.
Old welfare was a creation of old liberalism, which took capitalism for 
what was and sought to treat the poor as the inevitable, least fortunate 
among the proletariat. It was... endangered only because of efforts to make 
welfare policy do more than it could possibly do. New welfare is a 
creation of new liberalism, interest-group liberalism. While new welfare 
defines poverty in simple economic terms, it rejects the notion of poverty 
as a natural and inevitable sector of economic life....It seeks to organize 
poverty as though it were a human characteristic comparable to any other 
'interest' around which interest groups form" (Lowi 1979, 200). It appears 
that the role of poverty law changed from legislation for the sake of
3aiding the unfortunate to measures designed to appease interest groups who 
used the sociological role of poverty to further their agendas.
In addition to reacting to the pressure from interest groups, Kennedy 
and later Johnson declared that poverty was not declining fast enough in 
the wake of the economic progress.2 In his study of the structure of 
capitalism in America, Ronald Nash writes, "before the War on Poverty 
began...people at the bottom of the economic ladder were making rapid 
strides toward improving their economic situation. Between 1950 and 1965, 
the percentage of poor Americans was cut in half (from about 30 percent to 
less than 15 percent)3.... Poverty in America fell most rapidly during the 
Eisenhower-Kennedy years when welfare assistance was only a fraction of 
what it became...The most rapid growth of poverty programs began, then, 
about the time when poverty in America reached its lowest level. When the 
War on Poverty programs were just beginning in '65, the percentage of poor 
families in the U.S. had dropped to 13.9 percent. This decline occurred 
without any help from any Great Society programs. The common wisdom of the 
mid-'60s was that the massive aid to the poor that started flowing under 
the War on Poverty programs would continue the reduction in poverty" (Nash 
1986, 178). Perhaps Johnson saw an opportunity to make a political splash 
by attaching himself to an economic phenomenon already underway. His 
opportunism appears to have manifested itself in two ways: "after eight
years of peace and steadily increasing prosperity, [the United States] 
roused itself and threw its considerable resources into two mighty efforts: 
bringing freedom to the people of South Vietnam and prosperity to the poor 
in America. Then the tragic death of John Kennedy thrust Lyndon Johnson 
into the presidency. With characteristic force and impetuosity, and eager
to establish himself as one of our greatest presidents, Johnson rapidly 
escalated both wars" (Anderson 1978, 15).
If Johnson's aim was political notoriety and not simply to alleviate 
the suffering of the poor in America, it is not too difficult to forecast 
that the outcome of Johnson's efforts would be skewed away from alleviating 
poverty and toward a burgeoning of the governmental welfare bureaucracy.
Put more simply, if Johnson was concentrating more on expansion of 
government for its own sake rather than on relief, he was destined to fail 
at the task of alleviating poverty. In an economic sense, to alleviate 
poverty one must be willing to free up the market and allow it to function 
according to the rewards and penalties of the profit and loss system. No 
amount of income redistribution or regulation of industry can achieve the 
level of prosperity and high relative standard of living that an unfettered 
market can achieve. However, Johnson was not concerned primarily with the 
economic aspects of the War on Poverty. "Johnson's crusade was 
predominantly political. By taking the political initiative, he thought he 
could build federal institutions that would provide sustenance and 
opportunity to the poor. As for the economics of the War on Poverty, well, 
that was of little concern to Johnson. If there was some problem, he would 
fix it later. And what about moral values and concepts of responsibility? 
That was a little ethereal to the man of action. Politics turns on power 
and rights, not on social values" (Butler and Kondratas, 25).
Johnson's administration faced a cruel choice: "Public policy can
take two basic approaches to the war on poverty. One is structural: to
raise the earning capacities, equipping the poor of the generation and the 
potential poor of the next with the means to earn above-poverty incomes
5through normal employment. The other is distributive: to make up income
deficiencies by direct government grants in cash or in kind by subsidized 
employment" (Tobin 1974, 58). As will be discussed later on, the approach 
the Johnson administration chose was the latter. However, they did not 
consider this decision a simple choice between two alternatives. This 
distributive path was taken by administrators who believed that they had no 
real choice, that poverty had to be gotten rid of, and gotten rid of by 
government. "Getting down to political realities, alleviation was... 
costing too much. Worse yet, too much of it was going to the wrong people. 
Still worse, the size of the welfare portion of public expenditures did not 
seem to show any downward responsiveness to prosperity....prosperity is no 
antidote for poverty. If the bulk of public assistance is for 
unemployables, neither it nor the poor will be eradicated by an economy 
heated up to even 98 percent of full employment" (Lowi 1979, 207-08).
Johnson's broad yet shortsighted view, besides being an ideological 
matter, was a manifestation of years of technocratic and Keynesian 
influence upon America. The classical liberal tradition of individuality, 
upon which the country was built, no longer held the will of the majority 
in the 1960s. The dominant political ideology, called the New Frontier 
under Kennedy and the Great Society under Johnson, had led to a belief in 
putting 'experts' in the driver's seat of not only the economy but of all 
aspects of the nation, as if there were some central mechanism, outside the 
market, that could bring progress and prosperity. This so-called social 
engineering of the nation was based on a belief in "the capacity of human 
foresight, using subtly graduated [sociological] incentives and 
disincentives, and sharply focused programs, to affect human behavior and
6to improve the human condition. This was the dominant ideology of social 
policy in the 1960s and 1970s..." (Glazer 1984, 83-84). With an eye on 
such an important matter as improving the human condition, it appears that 
the politicians of the 1960s had little time to spend musing over the long 
run effects of their proposed changes in social welfare administration. 
Apparently, they trusted that social engineering could only make for a 
better future. "The Great Society grew out of the self-confidence of the 
mid-1960s--an optimism...based on a belief in the social institutions of 
America... grounded in the idea that federal power can solve all problems, 
right all wrongs, make up for all shortcomings" (Butler and Kondratas 1987, 
226). Perhaps Johnson and the other formulators of the War on Poverty saw 
no need to be concerned with the long run effects of their proposals 
because they believed that no matter what the issue, the power of 
government could make matters right.
The essential aim of Johnson's War on Poverty, in light of his faith 
in government and his desire to set an historic precedent, was simply "to 
raise people's incomes above the poverty line" (Anderson 1978, 17).A This 
goal extended the reach of existing social welfare programs, which had been 
specifically aimed at providing a social safety net for the ravages of an 
up-and-down market economy, but which ended up acting virtually as a system 
of guaranteed income. "In the United States, Federal programs to relieve 
poverty and unemployment first went into effect on a large scale in the 
Great Depression. The argument was that they were needed only during the 
emergency. Since then the nation has enjoyed a return of prosperity, an 
enormous growth in national income, a fall in employment to record low 
levels, and a sharp decline (by any consistent definition) in the number
7and proportion of the poor. Yet relief, unemployment insurance, Social 
Security, and scores of other welfare programs have expanded at an 
accelerative rate" (Hazlitt 1969, 57). No longer was social welfare 
administration a realm of last resort. It had taken on the task of 
assuring dignity more akin to a command rather than a mafket economy. 
Johnson sought to legitimize and expand this system. Under such a system, 
poverty became homogeneous, without regard to its origin.
This emphasis on the marginal poor (employable, but down on their 
luck), as well as the hardcore poor (those considered unemployable),5 grew 
out of the belief that all poverty results from causes beyond the control 
of individuals. Therefore, the role of government was clearly to eliminate 
those societal conditions that allowed for the presence of poverty. This 
view was used to explain the failure of earlier social welfare programs to 
eliminate poverty, since they were aimed only at relief.
Johnson was not the first politician to use the inevitability of 
poverty argument to legitimize government intervention in the economy,6 but 
he was among the first politicians in modern history to ground lasting 
social programs in the belief that poverty was structural and therefore 
inevitable.
Poverty, however, is not a modern concept, borne of the Industrial 
Revolution and economic progress. Every society has faced the task of how 
to handle the inevitable existence of poverty, and most have recognized the 
need to have a policy regarding poverty. In Out of the Poverty Trap,
Stuart Butler and Anna Kondratas write, "ever since the Passage of the 
Elizabethan Poor Laws in 1598, the history of Anglo-American thought and 
policy on the subject of welfare reveals three inextricably intertwined
themes: rendering humane public assistance to the needy; a concern that
rendering assistance without a work requirement fosters dependency; and an 
attempt to define the limits of public obligation in order to control 
outflows from the public purse" (Butler and Kondratas 1987, 29-30). 
Unfortunately, if the members of a society do not have a basic 
understanding of human action, or praxeology,7 and the economic 
relationships that flow from human action, society might come to believe 
that all poverty is caused by society and not by individual choices and 
actions, and therefore must be preventable by society. However, this is 
not the case. In a market economy, poverty exists for two reasons: first,
because individuals have committed entrepreneurial error and therefore have 
lost their investments in the market, and second, because, for a variety of 
reasons, individuals are unable or unwilling to work to support themselves. 
In all cases but those concerning individuals who are unable to care for 
themselves, poverty is either a temporary condition stemming from risks 
that did not pay off, or the result of a choice of leisure over work. 
Neither of these latter conditions warrants the concern of the government 
or action on the part of society. Historically, individuals who are 
unable to work have been the realm of social welfare programs, both private 
and public.
However, Johnson and his peers were of a different mind on the 
poverty issue. "Before the mid-1960s, when the War on Poverty began, 
public assistance programs were generally limited to people who for one 
reason or another were outside the labor force. With that war there began 
an earnest effort to use public assistance to supplement the incomes of 
people who were working but whose earnings were low" (Wagner 1989, 1).
9Rather than recognizing the realities of poverty and aiming assistance at 
the hardcore poor, administrators gathered all those labeled poor in the 
United States in the 1960s into one bundle, gave the bundle a measure of 
statistical significance relative to the rest of the population, and went 
after their goal with a vengeance.
This new emphasis on government social welfare across a broad range 
of incomes occurred around the world, brought about by the upheavals of 
1930s depression and World War II. "International recession, the 
contraction of world trade and mass unemployment all pointed to a need for 
national economic management and a greater state involvement in social 
life. In the 1930s the apparent success of totalitarian regimes--the Nazis 
'solved' the problem of six million unemployed people in Germany in a few 
years, while Stalin accomplished a more rapid process of industrialization 
and urbanization in Russia than had been achieved anywhere else--challenged 
liberal democratic governments to discover new ways to run their societies. 
The war itself drew states further than ever before in the direction of 
economic and social activities. Keynesian economists seemed to offer a 
method of national economic management for the postwar period that was 
consistent with liberal democratic traditions" (Jordan 1987, 4). This view 
makes Johnson's words in his inaugural address concerning the United 
States' status as the wealthiest nation on earth and the fact that the 
United states could not afford to lose the war on poverty all the more 
foreboding. It was Johnson's concern with the international posture of the 
United States and not with the relief of the poor in the United States that 
appears to have spurred his drive for social welfare expansion.
Seeking a method of social welfare management consistent with liberal
10
democratic traditions was not due to any failure of the command economies 
around the world to deal with poverty their own way. Rather, "A few 
countries have been successful in the use of corporate methods of economic 
management, and have also kept down unemployment and sustained their social 
services. What these countries--Sweden, Austria, Norway--have in common is 
that they are small, homogeneous, and rich, with efficient industrial 
sectors and a strong continuity of (mainly social democratic) governments. 
Their success still inspires social democrats and trade unionists in other 
European countries [and in America], even where none of these conditions 
exist" (Jordan 1987, 5).8 Is emulation of the successes of wartime 
totalitarian regimes and peacetime command economies a formula for 
successful social welfare administration in a capitalist society? It would 
hardy seem so. "It seems obvious that the state must have some such 
[social service] obligation, since it is supposed to save [its citizens] 
from preventable harm. But whether it should do this in a generalized and 
systematic way is open to dispute.... It was not until after the second 
world war that there was a general move toward universal social services" 
(Jordan 1987, 98).
What Johnson and his administration did, in trying to be true to 
their beliefs about the condition of poverty, was to create an array of 
social services that broadened the social safety net function of 
government, wrought by Franklin Roosevelt, into a paternalistic, provider- 
state system of redistribution and guaranteed income. This array was 
deemed necessary to cover all aspects of poverty: "The poverty problem had
many roots...one was high unemployment in many communities. Single-parent 
families caused by divorce or desertion was also a factor. Another was the
11
disability or death of the principal wage earner. Still another was low 
productivity and hence low pay, due to inadequate education, health care, 
training, and motivation" (Butler and Kondratas 1987, 8). Obviously, these 
roots did not grow out of the same economic tree--some were simple economic 
issues and others moral issues, with the latter formerly considered outside 
the realm of government action. However, as was mentioned earlier, "what 
emerged in the mid-1960s was an almost unbroken intellectual consensus that 
the individualist explanation of poverty was altogether outmoded and 
reactionary. Poverty was not a consequence of indolence or vice. It was 
not the just deserts of people who didn't try hard enough. It was produced 
by conditions that had nothing to do with individual virtue or effort. 
Poverty was not the fault of the individual but of the system" (Murray 
1984, 29). Therefore, the War on Poverty was a response to this 
fundamental shift in attitudes, from a belief in self-reliance to a belief 
in paternalistic government social welfare and income redistribution. If 
Johnson and his peers truly believed poverty was not the fault of the 
individual but of the system, creating a system based on redistribution of 
the wealth of the system was an inevitable solution. "Liberal capitalist 
states, like Britain and the United States in the nineteenth century, 
rested heavily on the idea that fairness was achieved by a combination of 
the market and the household: both allowed voluntary exchange, the one
commercial and the other customary, and each complemented the other. In 
this century, support for these ideas has been eroded, and the state's role 
in providing services has increased, in line with ideas that were already 
part of the continental tradition. It was recognized that market outcomes 
were not always fair, and required some readjustment; and that some people
12
needed more care than they were able to get from families or other informal 
sources" (Jordan 1987, 215).
The crucial groundwork for the evolution from an individualist, 
classical liberal society, to a redistributive society, culminating under 
Lyndon Johnson, was laid in three stages. The process started during the 
years 1827 to 1917, when interpretations of the Constitution, especially 
under Marshall's Supreme Court, provided precedent for the later New Deal 
and War on Poverty/Great Society programs. Two cases were pivotal in 
opening the door to income redistribution. In 1821, the bankruptcy case of 
Ogden v. Saunders marked the turning point in the use of the contract 
clause of the Constitution as a barrier to income transfers. The Court 
held in Ogden v. Saunders that states could pass bankruptcy laws that would 
affect contracts written after the law went into effect. "In effect, this 
decision allowed the government to alter any property rights involved in a 
contractual exchange as long as that alteration occurred before the 
contract was entered into. Thus the freedom of property owners to use 
their property as they saw fit was appreciably reduced; perhaps more 
important, the benefits to transfer activity appreciably increased" 
(Anderson and Hill 1980, 40).
In 1877, the case of Munn v. Illinois, which involved price-setting 
regulations,9 had the following effect: "the door for transfer activity at
the federal level was thrown open as the court legitimized governmental 
regulation of private property" (Anderson and Hill 1980, 59-60). Further, 
"From 1877 to 1917 the Constitution was altered in numerous ways that made 
transfers much easier to obtain. Except for the income tax amendment 
[1913], all of these changes came through interpretation. Although the
13
full fruits of these changes were not seen for several decades, the 
Constitutional basis for a transfer society had been laid."10
The second significant era in the legitimization of income transfers 
came during the 1930s, when there was a shift from a Congress-centered 
government to an Executive-centered government. During this era there 
occurred the Great Depression (1929-1940) and the New Deal legislation 
under Franklin Roosevelt. During this period, the general view of poverty 
shifted radically.11 Poverty was gaining the status of a social rather 
than an individual concern. The arrival of the Great Depression was 
considered proof of the failure of the market economy, rather than the 
inevitable outcome of a business cycle caused by credit expansion.12 To 
most, the Great Depression represented a scale of industrial failure so 
great as to make nationalization of welfare necessary. "The Depression 
revealed that capitalistic poverty is systematic. Obviously this meant 
that something systematic should be done about it" (Lowi 1979, 199).
This thesis, though, is primarily concerned with the third 
significant era for social welfare administration in the United States, 
which occurred from the late 1950s to the 1970s. During this era, explicit 
income redistribution became the focus of social welfare legislation, and 
Lyndon Johnson led the parade in implementing it.
Up to the late 1950s, all efforts to implement income redistribution 
in the United States had been implicit. Since the dawn of this third era, 
various efforts have were made to rationalize the necessity for income 
redistribution and to bring income redistribution out into the open. These 
efforts had one goal: to eliminate "objective poverty managed by a broad
delegation of power" (Lowi 1979, 205). The resounding success in
14
establishing antipoverty programs during this era, culminating in the War 
on Poverty, can be attributed to the politicians of that day, who 
considered themselves "hard-nosed idealists who would be able to get 
results where the social workers had failed" (Murray 1984, 23). These 
politicians believed that the ideas of the Progressives and the proposals 
of the New Dealers had been good in theory, but were implemented poorly.
The Kennedy-Johnson leadership believed that people, as products of their 
environment, would change if their environment changed. "What emerged in 
the mid-1960s was an almost unbroken intellectual consensus that the 
individualist explanation of poverty was altogether outmoded and 
reactionary. Poverty was not a consequence of indolence or vice. It was 
not the just deserts of people who didn't try hard enough. It was produced
by conditions that had nothing to do with individual virtue or effort.
Poverty was not the fault of the individual but of the system" (Murray 
1984, 29).
This shift in belief also brought with it a new view on how the new 
social welfare system should be administered. New social welfare advocates 
sought a more dignified system, one which did not use prying questions to 
determine if an individual was eligible for relief. Income redistribution 
would simply even the spoils of the market without regard to how or why one 
person earned more or less than another. Income redistribution would
eliminate any need for a means test to determine eligibility. Advocates of
elimination of the means test advanced two reasons for their position: 
first, the means test is humiliating and degrading; and second, the means 
test leads to complex administrative red tape. Henry Hazlitt sees the idea 
of providing a measure of dignity to those given relief as an ironic
15
proposal. "The guaranteed-income advocates think they can do away with all 
this [loss of dignity caused by the use of a prying means test] by using 
the 'simple' mechanism of having everybody fill out an income tax blank, 
whereupon the government would send a check to everybody for the amount 
that his income, so reported, fell below the government's set 'poverty- 
line' minimum.
"The belief that this income tax mechanism would be administratively 
simple is a delusion....The amount of concealment and falsification that 
would be practiced by persons trying to get as high a guaranteed income as 
possible would probably be enormous." Further, "Is a means test for relief 
necessarily any more humiliating than the ordeal that the taxpayer must go 
through when his income tax is being examined--when every question he is 
asked and record he is required to provide implies that he is a potential 
crook? If the reply to this inquisition is that it is necessary to protect 
the government from fraud, then the same reply is valid as applied to 
applicants for relief or a guaranteed income. It would be a strange double 
standard to insist that those who were being forced to pay the guaranteed 
income to others should be subject to an investigation from which those who 
applied for the guaranteed income would be exempt" (Hazlitt 1969, 72-73). 
Though the debate over a simplified system of guaranteed income and 
determination if eligibility continued into the 1970s, no explicit scheme 
was enacted; instead, the government continued to rely on implicit income 
redistribution.
The specific legislation passed under the War on Poverty, though not 
explicitly called income redistribution, had a redistributionary effect. 
This legislation, all of which was passed between 1964 and 1965, included
16
the Civil Rights Act, food stamp legislation, the Economic Opportunity Act, 
programs for mass transportation, Medicare, Medicaid, the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act, the Higher Education Act, and the Public Works and 
Economic Development Act. Therefore, by the time Johnson had been in 
office less than three years, the basic legislation to create the Great 
Society was firmly in place. This was in addition to the Area 
Redevelopment Act and the Manpower Development and Training Act, broad 
legislation which was passed under Kennedy.
Due to the sheer numbers of people and dollars for relief encompassed 
under the War on Poverty, Johnson is given the nod as the most successful 
ideologue of the period: "few have denied that the key to everything was
Lyndon Johnson, the Big Texan with big ideas--a man who knew how to get 
things done in Washington. Johnson's uplifting vision of the Great Society 
was a call for energetic federal action in the confident belief that such a 
decisive tilt toward federal power constituted no threat to the American 
democratic system" (Butler and Kondratas 1987, 8).
The legislation listed above has been described as "antithetical to 
rational and responsible administration, because the principle of 
representation is antithetical to the principle of administration. The 
further down the line one delegates power, the further into the 
administrative process one is forced to provide representation. While much 
of this is unavoidable, formalizing the fusion of administration and 
representation is a way of discrediting both. The worst results of 
interest-group liberalism and new welfare particularly follow from this" 
(Lowi 1979, 212). Lowi goes on to point out that this new legislation put 
the responsibility for delegating transfers into the hands of social
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welfare administrators far down the administrative line--in effect giving 
local personnel the task and the personal responsibility for making federal 
law.13
The specific piece of War on Poverty legislation that fused 
administration and representation was the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 
(EOA), "an omnibus act composed of seven titles and approximately ten 
programs--approximately because the number can shift according to the 
definition of a program" (Lowi 1979, 212). This Act is considered non­
specific and therefore subject to the whims of individual interpretation 
because it contains no operating standards, unlike the specific, categoric, 
operative guidelines of the earlier Social Security statute. "The 
partisans praised [the EOA] by condemning old welfare for dealing only with 
symptoms and not with causes. Yet...it was a war in which neither the 
enemy nor the methods were positively determined....The Act is a catchall 
of job-creation, job-training, and money-providing programs aimed largely 
at making lower-class life a bit more comfortable for the existing lower 
classes."1*1 However, this task of making the lower classes more 
comfortable was only of secondary importance to the War on Poverty: "the 
intention was to change the behavior of the poor by providing them with the 
education, skills, and motivation to become more productive" (Butler and 
Kondratas 1987, 6. Emphasis mine). Put more simply, the EOA represented 
explicit social engineering couched in nebulous terms.
Community action was at the apex of the War on Poverty legislation, 
taking the form of the Community Action Program (CAP), under the umbrella 
of the EOA. CAP was used to gather all otherwise unrelated welfare 
programs together into a cohesive whole. CAP can be viewed as another
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typical piece of non-specific War on Poverty legislation. Under CAP, 
location for action is defined as "any urban or rural, or combined urban 
and rural, geographic area...including but not limited to a state, metro 
area, county, city, town, multicity unit, or multicounty unit..." (Lowi 
1979, 213). Jurisdiction is defined as the provision of "services, 
assistance, and other activities of sufficient scope and size to give 
promise of progress toward elimination of poverty or a cause or causes of 
poverty through developing employment opportunities, improving human 
performance, motivation, and productivity, or bettering the conditions 
under which people live, learn, and work..." (Lowi 1979, 213-14). 
Implementation of programs under CAP relied on the use of local 
administrators to engineer the plans of federal legislators.
If legislators were unwilling or unable to write more specific 
legislation or to oversee the administration of their own legislation, one 
must assume they did not know how, why, or for whom the War on Poverty was 
being fought. "These features [of non-specificity] reveal the meaning of 
the Great Society's poverty programs in no uncertain terms. The [EOA] is, 
especially in its most important and most novel titles, [e.g., CAP], 
completely process-oriented nonlaw. It speaks of reaching the causes of 
poverty, but this is almost entirely rhetorical, for there is nothing in 
these clauses of the statute and official records that even the most legal- 
minded bureaucrat had to feel guided by. There is no guidance because all 
the apparent guidance is suggestive and permissive. Categories are open- 
ended; they are lists always introduced with 'not limited to' or 'such as'" 
(Lowi 1979, 214).
This new welfare legislation also differed from earlier social
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welfare legislation in that it was manifested by the ideologues 
themselves15 and not by pressure from the public or the legislature: "with
the exception of civil rights legislation, the Great Society legislation 
was driven by presidential determination, not a social movement pressuring 
Congress. Thus the laws were riddled with concessions to powerful lobbies" 
(Butler and Kondratas 1987, 10). This presidential determination, in less 
than three years, transformed the role of the United States government in 
social welfare administration from that of providing a social safety net 
for the less fortunate ravaged by capitalism to that of redistributing 
incomes among individuals in order to provide them with "a standard of 
living compatible with human dignity" (Theobald 1965, 67).
The unwillingness to acknowledge inequality in society, despite its 
axiomatic existence in any society, was based in part on a faith in the 
power of money alone to affect standard of living. "In modern times, those 
who take the bureaucratic approach to the problem [of poverty] tend to 
define it in terms of people's financial condition. Accordingly, the 
magnitude of the problem is 'measured' by federal statisticians who attempt 
to count how many families have incomes which fall below the official 
poverty level. The solution to the problem is to give families living in 
poverty enough money to raise their income levels above the poverty line.
It follows that the purpose of welfare is quite simple: to give money
away" (Goodman and Stroup 1986, 8). However, money income alone cannot 
ensure a decent or satisfactory standard of living. Standard of living is 
too subjective a concept to be handled by expanding the government dole. I 
shall show later how attempts to narrow the equality gap using money only 
worsened the poverty 'problem,' and did not improve it.
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The poverty threshold from which the War on Poverty operated became 
the official measure of need in the United States in 1964. It was based on 
a 1955 Department of Agriculture food consumption survey which had 
concluded that families of three or more usually spend about one-third of 
their income on food. Based on this finding, the poverty threshold was 
initially set at three times the cost of the Department of Agriculture's 
1961 economy food plan. Mollie Orshansky, an analyst for the Social 
Security Administration, devised the poverty threshold from studies she 
made between 1963 and 1965. Her experimental and semiofficial tools were 
used to judge the progress of the War on Poverty by measuring changes in 
the number and demographic composition of low-income persons. Hazlitt 
writes, "in January of 1966, the President's Council of Economic Advisors 
indicated approval of 'uniformly determined payments to families based only 
on the amount by which their incomes fall short of minimum subsistence 
levels.' This plan, they declared, 'could be administered on a universal 
basis for all the poor and would be the most direct approach to reducing 
poverty'" (Hazlitt 1969, 63). These measures were made official in 1969, 
when the Census Bureau was given the task of updating and revising the 
changes in numbers and characteristics of those persons deemed poor. 
Additionally, in 1969, poverty thresholds were indexed to the Consumer 
Price Index and have been updated every year since to account for 
inflation. It is important to note here that the measure of the numbers 
and other demographics of lower-income families does not take into account 
individual preferences for allocating their income nor whether individuals 
believed themselves to be better or worse off at various levels of money 
income. "The poverty definition assumed that the pattern [of spending a
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particular percentage of income on food] would not change, so it is hardly 
surprising that [the bureaucrats] concluded that many low-income families 
cannot possibly have enough food to eat, even if they have sufficient 
income to purchase the basics.... the use of average budgets, rather than 
those reflecting the actual spending patterns of low-income families, would 
have overestimated poverty by 100 percent in 1962....Routine acceptance of 
methodology that leads to an artificially high estimate of poverty has 
obviously injected an enormous bias into the whole data series, affecting 
perceptions of the extent of poverty and the degree of anti-poverty 
measures needed" (Butler and Kondratas 1987, 44-45). This inevitable 
overestimation of poverty levels and the needs of low-income citizens was 
apparent from the inception of the use of these measures. However, "the 
people who used the statistics, the policymakers in government and the 
researchers in academia, had no valid way to make corrections in official 
government numbers. One man's corrections or adjustments were as good as 
any other man's. Consequently, they were forced either to ignore the 
income statistics altogether or to use them, consoling themselves with the 
knowledge that they were the best available. Inevitably they used them" 
(Anderson 1978, 21). Therefore, despite the poor measure of poverty that 
the poverty thresholds provide, they have been and continue to be used to 
assess policies. This tremendous bias existed at the inception of the War 
on Poverty, and has been perpetuated for 25 years. Attempts have been made 
to rectify these measures and to take a more complete and accurate look at 
poverty levels, but legislative decisions are still based on the same 
poverty estimates. Some of these attempts will be discussed further on in 
this thesis.
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Up to this point, I have been looking at the actual facts concerning 
social welfare administration in the United States. However, this begs the 
question of whether there is any need in the United States for a federally- 
mandated system of social welfare administration. Perhaps this is not the 
case. In order for such a presupposition to hold true, an examination of 
the legality of social welfare administration and support for it from the 
citizens of the country would have to concur.
It is difficult to define the legal status of social welfare 
administration, especially in relation to legislation passed under the War 
on Poverty. The preamble of the Constitution calls for promotion of the 
general welfare; and Article one, Section eight gives Congress the right to 
lay and collect taxes, (amended in 1913 to include income taxes), to 
provide for the general welfare of the United States. On the other hand, 
Article 14, section one denies the right of any state to deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property. Is collecting confiscatory income taxes for 
the implicit purpose of affecting income redistribution a violation of the 
Constitution? If income earned by an individual is his property, then 
denying individuals some of their property for a government aim not 
considered legitimate by the citizens under said government is contrary to 
the Constitution. Such confiscation of property is a violation of due 
process. However, a clear-cut consensus has yet to be formed in the United 
States over whether social welfare administration, and the form it has 
taken since 1965, is considered to be a legitimate role for the United 
States government.
The lack of a consensus over the proper role of government in 
providing relief is due in part to a lack of consensus over the proper role
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of government in general in modern American society. This disunity was 
brought on by the aforementioned shift from individuality to collectivism. 
F.A. Hayek has noted that the transformation from an individualist, self- 
determined society to one advocating collectivist government rule has 
shifted the task of justice. "The main difference between the order of 
society at which classical liberalism aimed and the sort of society into 
which it is now being transformed is that the former was governed by 
principles of just individual conduct while the new society is to satisfy 
the demands for 'social justice-or, in other words, that the former 
demanded just action by the individuals while the latter more and more 
places the duty of justice on authorities with power to command people what 
to do" (Hayek 1976, 2:65-66). If individuals have delegated the duty of 
providing justice to the government, social welfare administration can be 
considered to have a legitimate role in the United States. This semi­
legitimate, semi-legal role has created a grey area for social welfare 
administration in the United States; however, "certain kinds of conventions 
tend to evolve spontaneously in human society, and...these conventions come 
to have the moral status of principles of justice, of natural law. It is 
tempting to suppose that if the members of a society subscribe to a common 
moral code, then that code must serve some social purpose. There must be 
some sense, we are tempted to say, in which this code is good for society. 
But this is a mistake....Conventions can acquire moral force without 
contributing to the overall welfare of society. So if there is a unifying 
principle behind natural law, it is not a principle of social welfare" 
(Sugden 1986, 172). Therefore, despite the fact that social welfare 
administration in the United States has acquired an air of legitimacy by
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moral force and Constitutional interpretation, the use of confiscatory 
taxation to redistribute income, for whatever moral reason, violates the 
due process clause of the Constitution (based on a strict interpretation of 
the Constitution). Such violation leads to a centralized, command economy 
(or what Richard Wagner calls a majoritarian democracy rather than a 
contractarian democracy), no matter what the Constitution claims to 
prevent. "The central idea of a constitutionally limited democracy is that 
government is not a source of rights [including granting the right to a 
minimum income] but a reflection of people's use of their rights. But a 
majoritarian democracy becomes a source of rights, with rights in turn 
being brokered through legislative processes. In such a setting the 
security of ownership claims weakens. It then becomes rational to discount 
more fully the future consequences of present actions, because the 
likelihood of bearing those consequences is lessened" (Wagner 1989, 190).
It appears, then, that allowing the government any role in the 
definition or maintenance of property rights, without specific rules making 
an attempt to change basic rights very difficult, leaves open the door for 
arbitrary transfer of rights. Since the interpretations of the 
Constitution detailed above demonstrate the loss of specificity in 
allocating and maintaining individual property rights, no legal barrier 
exists to prevent implicit income redistribution.
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NOTES TO SECTION 1
1. President Kennedy, with his view of the New Frontier, began the new 
liberal push for expanded social welfare legislation. However, his efforts 
were cut short upon his assassination before significant changes could be 
written into law. Johnson took up the social welfare cause in 1963. In 
this thesis, I will be concentrating mainly upon Johnson's efforts and 
their present manifestations.
2. See James Gwartney and Thomas S. McCaleb, "Have Antipoverty Programs 
Increased Poverty?," Cato Journal 5 (no. 1): 2.
3. I will have more to say on the use of statistics to measure poverty in a
later section of this thesis.
4. I will discuss the use of a poverty line later in this section and again 
in the section on statistics.
5. See on this distinction, James Gwartney and Thomas S. McCaleb, "Have
Antipoverty Programs Increased Poverty?," 8.
6. "The argument that poverty is caused by conditions over which low- 
income people have no control is not a new one. Nineteenth century critics 
of the Elizabethan Poor Laws such as Charles Dickens, Arnold Bennett, and 
George Lundsburg, repeatedly emphasized this view, and attacked the Poor 
Laws as inhumane." John C. Goodman and Michael Stroup, Privatizing the 
Welfare State, Policy Report no. 123, (Dallas: The National Center for 
Policy Analysis, 1986), 7.
7. See Ludwig von Mises, Human Action, (Yale Univ. Press, 1949 [1963]), 
esp. Ch. 1.
8. Of course, in more recent times, the success of these social democratic 
states has come under question. See my essay "The Swedish Welfare State 
and Its Implications for the United States," 1989.
9. "In the lower courts counsel for the plaintiff had argued in terms of 
the taking of private property: "For the first time since the union of the 
states a legislature of a state has attempted to control the property, 
capital and labor of a private individual by fixing the prices he may 
receive from other private persons who choose to deal with him."" W.C. 
Goudy, Hunn and Scott v. Illinois, Illinois Supreme Court (October term, 
1875), 1. Quoted in Anderson and Hill, Birth of a Transfer Society, 62.
10. Anderson and Hill, Birth of a Transfer Society, 70. Emphasis mine.
11. This was earlier manifested in the Progressive Era legislation, and 
came to fruition under the New Deal.
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12. Regarding the American economy in the 1920s: "This economy was, in
fact, a mixture of two very different, and basically conflicting, forces. 
One the one hand, America experienced a genuine prosperity, based on heavy 
savings and investment in highly productive capital. This great advance 
raised American living standards. On the other hand, we also suffered a 
credit-expansion, with resulting accumulation of malinvested capital, 
leading finally and inevitably to economic crisis." Murray Rothbard, 
America's Great Depression, (New York: Richardson & Snyder, 1963 [1972]),
6. Emphasis Rothbard's.
13. See Lowi, The End of Liberalism, 210.
14. Lowi, The End of Liberalism, 213. The EOA legislation brought in new 
social welfare programs, such as Job Corps, Work-Study, and VISTA, and it 
also expanded programs already in existence.
15. "The mid- and late-1960s did not see a revolution in American opinion. 
The analogy to the reform period in the 60s is not the New Deal....the 
shift in assumptions occurred among a small group relative to the entire 
population, but one of enormous influence. The group is, with no 
pejorative connotations, best labeled the intelligentsia...people who deal 
professionally with ideas....It includes the upper echelons of... academia, 
journalism, publishing, and research centers...[and] in the civil service, 
in key positions just below the presidential appointment level, where so 
much of the policy formation goes on." Murray, Losing Ground, 41-42.
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Section 2: Circumstances Resulting From the 
Implementation of the War on Poverty
Since the War on Poverty constituted an expansion of implicit income 
redistribution in the United States, and since much is known a priori about 
what forced income redistribution will do to an economy, much can be 
anticipated about the outcomes of Johnson's war by citing pure theory, 
before laying out the actual historical outcomes of the War on Poverty. 
Therefore, in this section, I will first discuss the inevitable outcomes of 
any attempt to alleviate poverty by the central authority, and then apply 
this discussion to the actual outcomes of the War on Poverty programs.
Income redistribution is an attempt to guarantee well-being to 
citizens from a standpoint outside the marketplace. This attempt must grow 
out of a belief in the function of government as a provider of security, 
and is antithetical to the classical liberal tradition of the United 
States. Under this tradition, the inevitability of some measure of poverty 
in society encouraged most citizens to strive for economic autonomy in 
order not to succumb to the ravages of the market economy. Under the new 
liberalism that matured in the 1960s, legislators sought to rearrange 
market relationships so that people might have a measure of security before 
entering into market relationships. This rearrangement was based on the 
structural rather than the individual view of poverty, and denied that 
"poverty is as much a state of mind as a physical condition. Its causes 
are so deep and complex as to defy the well-intentioned efforts of sweeping 
federal programs" (Butler and Kondratas 1987, 40).
What a belief in income redistribution assumes is the possibility of 
perfecting or improving the market process to benefit society, at the
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expense of some measure of individual freedom. This cannot be denied. Any 
attempt, outside the market, to change the market process invalidates the 
decisions made by individuals regarding their own subjective well-being. 
Since the inception of implicit income redistribution, there has been an 
overt attempt at "correlation of poverty and hunger with government 
planning and regulation, and of economic development and nutritional 
progress with economic freedom..." (Osterfeld 1985, 91). This attempt to 
reorder the market to satisfy some extra-market desire, i.e. the guarantee 
of economic well-being, assumes that a measure of absolute wealth and 
equality is enough to satisfy the majority of members of a society. But 
Peter Hill points out that it may be relative well-being, subjective to the 
individual, which is the true concern of individuals. "If the relative 
measure of well-being is the appropriate one, then the market order may not 
solve the poverty problem. The question of the appropriate measure is 
difficult; because if we... legitimate envy we may obstruct the very process 
that is the best hope for alleviating the poverty of millions of people, 
namely economic growth. Too much concern with relative position can reduce 
the possibility that everybody's absolute wealth can be increased" (Hill 
1987, 45). Hill makes clear here that a provider state which attempts to 
affect income equality outside the market process succeeds only in 
affecting absolute money income and nothing else. This attempt, since it 
cannot reduce relative, subjective poverty, must fail and must result in a 
greater degree of inequality and dissatisfaction among members of society 
who expected to be better off through no effort on their part. This 
attempt constitutes a denial of the market process and a belief in the 
supremacy of non-market institutions over market institutions. Bill Jordan
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writes, "Pure liberalism [classical liberalism] would...uphold a subjective 
view of welfare and respect individual projects and commitments; but it 
would give no guarantees against misfortunes, misjudgments and failures.... 
Hence, while seeming to give equal autonomy for all the liberal model of 
society produces great inequality..." (Jordan 1987, 41). The point is that 
this inequality, while seeming to be a sad state of affairs, is the 
hallmark of an individualist society, and allows for the attainment of the 
greatest degree of subjective well-being as can be had by individuals.
This is not to say that relative poverty is any less painful than 
absolute poverty, but that no matter what the type of society, no one 
outside the individual can make the individual feel better off, for "in a 
wealthy country, absolute poverty may be substantially removed, yet many 
people will still feel poor when they compare themselves with those at the 
top of the economic pile....And such relative poverty usually makes people 
feel just as poor as does absolute poverty" (Butler and Kondratas 1987,
31).
Faced with the impossible task of attempting to make people feel more 
equal, legislators essentially paint themselves into a corner, forced to 
pile legislative action upon legislative action, none of which seems to 
solve the inequality problem. What must result is less equality and less 
freedom than at the starting point. "Like the spurious 'economic freedom,' 
and with more justice, economic security is often represented as an 
indispensable condition of real liberty. In a sense this is both true and 
important....[But] when security is understood in too absolute a sense, the 
general striving for it, far from increasing the chances of freedom, 
becomes the gravest threat to it" (Hayek [1944] 1976, 119). However, this
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outcome is not necessarily a surprise to legislators, and is often 
considered in relation to the so-called net benefits of the program.
Brunner writes, "Every set of political institutions provides its specific 
mix of positive and negative sum social games. The weight of wealth- 
impeding activities depends thus on the sociopolitical arrangements of 
nations" (Brunner 1985, 42-43).1
If a society sets out to alleviate that which it cannot alleviate, 
for example, poverty, it will continue to go after the condition despite 
legislative failure, since few governments will admit defeat and then 
retreat. Often, prior to embarking on a new program, its legitimacy is 
enhanced by making the condition affected by the program one to which 
everyone in a society is entitled to have or to be delivered from. In 
essence, the condition is raised to the status of a right, and then it is 
legislated. "By the end of the 1970s," writes Seymour Lipset, "the 
dominant mood of the public was ideologically conservative-- in favor of 
reducing government regulations, taxes, and spending--but programmatically 
liberal--opposed to eliminating most specific regulations and favorable to 
spending the same amount or more for most social programs designed to 
benefit the underprivileged. This dichotomy may result from the way the 
regulatory-welfare state is conceptualized and discussed--spending for the 
disadvantaged is called an 'entitlement,' a right, and it is difficult to 
cut someone's rights."2
Once a government finds it can create and legislate individual 
rights, it must reach the conclusion that there is no logical stopping- 
point for government intervention into society and the economy. The 
outcome of the legislation has little or no effect on its future, as is
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evidenced in the above reference to Lipset, and by the following from 
Richard Wagner: "a legislature that is able to redefine and rearrange
rights at will can hardly be expected to restrain itself when it deals with 
that subset of human activities and concerns that are the welfare state" 
(Wagner 1989, 190). It is this subset of human activities that comprises 
the modern welfare state, and the effects of rights legislation that I am 
concerned with in this thesis, because "Once the premise has been accepted 
that 'the poor,' as such have a 'right' to share in somebody else's income 
--regardless of the reasons why they are poor or others are better off-- 
there is no logical stopping place in distributing money and favors to 
them, short of the point where this brings about equality of income for 
all. If I have a 'right' to a 'minimum income sufficient to live in 
decency,' whether I am willing to work for it or not, why don't I also have 
a 'right' to just as much income as you have, regardless of whether you 
earn it and I don't?" (Hazlitt 1973, 96). Therefore, a free society that 
redefines individual rights to bring about equality must eventually spiral 
into a command economy.
Specifically, when we speak of entitlements to individuals, based on 
a new definition of individual rights, the lack of a logical stopping point 
for income redistribution is particularly devastating for the society as a 
whole, and for the well-being of the individuals who are part of the 
society, even before the economy becomes a command rather than a market 
economy. The negative effect upon individuals and economic relationships 
occurs immediately upon redefinition of individual rights, because 
maintenance and expansion of new, legislated rights becomes the focus of 
the political process: "Once the premise is accepted that poverty is never
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the fault of the poor but the fault of 'society' (i.e., of the self- 
supporting), or of 'the capitalist system,' then there is no definable 
limit to be set on relief, and the politicians who want to be elected or 
reelected will compete with each other in proposing new 'welfare' programs 
to fill some hitherto 'unmet need,' or in proposing to increase the 
benefits or reduce the eligibility requirements of some existing program" 
(Hazlitt 1973, 96-97). With so much attention being paid to the 
redefinition of rights, little attention can be paid to the ultimate role 
of government: protection of the inalienable rights of life, liberty and
property. As a matter of fact, the redefinition of rights can serve only 
to cannibalize the very rights that are considered inalienable in the first 
place. In The Unheavenly City Revisited, Edward Banfield recognizes this 
inevitable clash of inalienable rights and new, legislated rights:
"Clearly, a measure is infeasible if aimed at the simultaneous attainment 
of mutually exclusive ends. Two persons cannot both be satisfied if one's 
satisfaction is constituted of the other's nonsatisfaction" (Banfield 1974, 
261). Since new, legislated rights depend on the denial of inalienable 
rights, (for, if they did not, there would be no need for them in the first 
place), their inception must deny productive individuals some of their 
livelihood in order to provide for non-productive individuals. 
Redistribution of rights or income can only be based upon given resources 
and productive processes. The government cannot create more wealth or 
production; the government is merely a net consumer of the riches of 
society, and has nothing to contribute to the productive process.
Therefore, any redistribution must have a negative effect on the productive 
process, because redistribution decreases the rewards to individuals from
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their own individual effort. Richard Wagner writes, "The impact of 
government on the distribution of income can be assessed only after 
comparing the distribution of expenditure benefits with that of tax burden. 
But at the same time, as with taxation, it is not adequate to gauge the 
impact of government spending by examining only the initial apportionment 
of that spending. Spending programs will in turn elicit various forms of 
personal response, the effects of which must be attributed to the programs 
being examined....The very effort to use a spending program to redistribute 
income will induce reactions by recipients or beneficiaries that will at 
least partially, and perhaps even wholly, dissipate the ultimate 
redistributory impact of the program.... the more fully market processes 
operate to offset the equalizing effect of transfer programs, the more the 
effects of those programs will be excess burden and related forms of social 
waste" (Wagner 1989, 90). Therefore, theoretically, the use of transfers 
to implement income equality must be doomed to failure, must create more of 
the problem they attempt to alleviate, and must shrink the base from which 
to redistribute. Unfortunately, in denial of logical theory, "The notion 
that we have to depend on government to assist the poor has acquired the 
status of revealed truth" (Lee 1985, 17). The United States has sought, 
and is still seeking, to accomplish that which no government or society 
could hope to achieve.
The drive to get poverty legislation in place, despite its inevitable 
outcome, is based on an incomplete perspective of the legislation itself. 
"The programs of the welfare state are typically viewed from a product 
market perspective. The food stamp program is seen as giving people money 
to spend in grocery stores; other programs are similarly seen as providing
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people with material means of support without their having to earn them.
Any act of guarantee, however, implies the imposition of a liability on 
someone else. The factor market side of the award of such guarantees is 
the imposition of an obligation to labor to fulfill terms of that
guarantee. If the state is to award guarantees, it must at the same time
impose liabilities" (Wagner 1989, 111). If citizens are not knowledgeable 
of basic principles of human action and economics, they can and will be 
lulled into a false sense of economic security, based on the belief that 
redistribution of income is fair and does not hamper production, believing 
instead that income redistribution makes the most of the production 
process. However, "Certainty of a given income [cannot] be given to all if 
any freedom in the choice of one's occupation is to be allowed. And, if it
is provided for some, it becomes a privilege at the expense of others whose
security is thereby necessarily diminished" (Hayek [1944] 1976, 123).
Though no government should responsible for the education of its citizens, 
nothing can excuse the exploitation of the ignorance of citizens in order 
to steal from them, despite the fact that "All political structures 
determine potential opportunities for manipulation within the rules 
accepted for their operations. They unavoidably offer incentives to be 
used for purposes of wealth redistribution among participants of the social 
game....All political structure... involves simultaneously a wealth-creating 
and a wealth-impeding dimension. In contrast to the state of anarchy, 
however, the wealth-obstructing activities proceed in accordance to a 
recognized and generally-accepted set of rules" (Brunner 1985, 42).
With the rise in the influence of interest groups upon the operations 
of government in America, the use of wealth-impeding politics has gained
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positive status. If the proper rhetoric is used, state-sponsored theft of 
income and property can be legitimized. Failures of measures to help the 
unfortunate are rarely, if ever, blamed on the political process. Such 
failures actually serve to encourage more legislation: not simply to mend
the fence existing legislation has built against the market process, but to 
broaden the confines of the corral. "The prime motivation for government 
transfer programs is assumed to be to help the poor and reduce income 
inequality," writes Dwight Lee, "If these programs fail in what they were 
set up to accomplish, the problem is seldom seen to be anything inherent in 
the political process that spawned the programs" (Lee 1985, 18).
The use of interest-group pressure brings about a political process 
such as the one described throughout this section. The results of this 
type of system, when allowed to rearrange the rights of individuals, are 
predictable and have devastating effects on the economy, both in the short 
run and the long run: "if you are going to have a political system in which 
people have an unrestricted right to vote on economic issues, then they are 
going to vote in an unrestricted way on economic issues. And more likely 
than not, they will vote for policies that are in their self-interest. The 
bottom line will be that you will have all kinds of income transfers" 
(Goodman 1985, 35). The policies of the modern welfare state, and their 
outcomes, are inevitable and predictable. Instead of alleviating poverty, 
they simply expand, maintain, and legitimize poverty.
In light of these theoretical assumptions and implications, I turn 
now to the outcomes of the implementation of the War on Poverty. First, 
some perspective: "As the War on Poverty began to gain momentum in 1965,
federal, state, and local governments together were spending over $77
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billion a year on social welfare programs. Most of the government spending 
was for social security benefits and education. Just slightly over $6 
billion was being spent on direct welfare. The task of eliminating poverty 
was viewed as extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible. At that time, 
some 33 million Americans were officially classified as poor. The poverty 
line was then a little over $3000 a year for a family of four. Each year 
it has adjusted upwards to account for inflation [it is now over $11,000 
for a family of four]. Tens of billions of dollars would have to be given 
to all those below the official poverty line if they were to catch or 
surpass that ever upward-moving standard that divided the country into the 
poor and the nonpoor" (Anderson 1978, 16).
According to the theoretical guidelines laid out above, certain 
outcomes are inevitable when individual rights are redefined to bring about 
income redistribution. These include: an increase in that condition for
which the redistribution was begun, a decrease in productive activity on 
the part of individuals, and a strengthening of the power of special- 
interest groups. Additionally, a decline in efforts to provide relief to 
the poor on the part of the private sector and changes in the composition 
of consumer choices for their own well-being are outcomes of the expansion 
of income redistribution. Each of these factors will be discussed in turn. 
But first, what is the consensus? Does America see the War on Poverty as a 
success or a failure?
Those who study the War on Poverty, and are willing to put their 
opinions on paper, are relatively few in number. One must assume this 
small number is due to the avoidance of biting the hand of government, 
since most of us depend on government for some of our livelihood. Most of
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the critics who grudgingly concede that the War on Poverty might not have 
achieved its goals cling to its programs as better than no social programs 
at all. Apparently, no one who is a supporter of social programs wishes to 
admit that any such war was doomed to fail from the start and therefore 
should be scrapped posthaste. "Liberals will admit failures only if 
conservatives agree to an alternative way of reaching the essential goals 
of the War on Poverty. So far conservatives have failed to do so. They 
have either addressed only individual elements of the issues, or, more 
often, concentrated on criticism rather than reform" (Butler and Kondratas 
1987, 7). It seems as if supporters of social services would be willing to 
admit the failure of programs implemented since 1965, if only those who 
have opposed the programs all along provide an alternative first. But 
perhaps no alternative is needed at all. If the market were freed of its 
fetters, and individuals were allowed to keep their property, productivity 
and standard of living would 'solve' much of the poverty 'problem' that 
exists today. Peter Hill astutely points out that "A partial reason for 
our continuing belief that all anti-poverty measures must focus on 
redistributing existing wealth is the presumption that the world is zero 
sum. In other words, there is only a certain amount of wealth in the world 
and to improve the economic position of certain people others must have 
their wealth taken from them. But this is simply not the case. It is 
possible, through the application of human effort, to create wealth. 
Appropriate institutional structure can focus human creativity on the 
wealth-generating process and thus lead to overall improvement in the 
standard of living" (Hill 1987, 42). However, it is foolish, in today's 
interest-group dominated political scene, to suggest that the programs of
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the welfare state be nullified and a return to a free market economy 
encouraged, because the issue at hand is not simply providing relief to the 
poor, but also maintaining the welfare bureaucracy that is now in place.
"The plain fact, confirmed in poll after poll, is that the American 
people care deeply about the poor and the underprivileged--even if they do 
not know how to solve the problem. And no matter how many hits are scored 
against the Great Society, Americans will continue to give broad support to 
its programs until an alternative approach is presented to them that 
combines the basic goals laid out by Lyndon Johnson with mechanisms that 
stand more of a chance of actually working" (Butler and Kondratas 1987, 5). 
Any alternative approach that is suggested must be well thought out with a 
high degree of specificity, both in describing the problem it faces and the 
solution it offers. The hallmark of the failure of the War on Poverty 
programs is the fact that, while many problems were laid out in proving the 
need for a broadened welfare state, few solutions were worked out before 
legislation was put in place. "When 'solutions' are offered without 
specification of the means by which they are to be reached, it must be 
presumed that the means--if any exist--have yet to be discovered and that 
the 'solution' is therefore infeasible. Doubtless a 'change in the hearts 
and minds of men' would solve a great many problems. But how is it to be 
brought about? Except as the means are outlined and except as there is 
some real possibility of their being implemented, such 'solutions' are mere 
words" (Banfield 1974, 262-3). With all of the talk of solutions in the 
books and journal articles written on the welfare state, it is probably 
safe to assume that few people truly believe that the War on Poverty has 
been a resounding success. Even the most stalwart welfare state supporter
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would admit to some aspect of social welfare that could bear some fine 
tuning, especially since "the welfare system is highly decentralized and is 
not well integrated. There is no control and no way to make welfare 
responsive to changes in national policy" (Weil 1978, 8). Therefore, 
whether one is pro or con the welfare state, one can find flaws in the 
structure of the modern welfare state.
The first of the inevitable outcomes under a system of legislative 
income redistribution is the increased incidence of the condition the 
redistribution was meant to alleviate. Under the War on Poverty, the aim 
was to eliminate all poverty in America by June of 1964. In 1990, not only 
does poverty still exist, but, by some measures, greater numbers of people 
are poor than were at the inception of the War on Poverty: "in the Fall of
1983 the U.S. Bureau of the Census made an amazing announcement. According 
to the Census Bureau, there were 34.4 million Americans living in poverty 
in 1982. This is more than the number of people who were living in poverty 
in 1965 when the War on Poverty was just getting started" (National Center 
for Policy Analysis 1983, 1). This implies that the progress being made 
against poverty prior to the inception of War on Poverty legislation was 
not only halted, but reversed. While scholars might argue over the exact 
statistics,3 no one has yet refuted this fact: "when good intentions are
not wedded to sound theory, especially sound economic theory, good 
intentions can often result in actions that produce consequences directly 
opposite to those we planned" (Nash 1986, 9). Statistics are not needed 
to tell the story: "When evaluating present policy...it is...necessary to
concentrate upon...whether policies turn off entrepreneurial spirit and 
frustrate the process of coordination. n/i Such an evaluation belies the use
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of statistics.
Attempts have been made to attribute this resultant trend of rising 
rather than falling poverty to the phenomenon of the Samaritan's Dilemma: 
"This dilemma refers to the problem of moral hazard associated with the 
welfare state: the presence of insurance against an accident may reduce
the care people take to avoid an accident, thereby making an accident more 
likely" (Wagner 1989, 164).5 However, the role of poverty legislation 
since 1965 is not that of simply providing insurance, (except in the cases 
of Social Security and specific public insurance legislation), but to 
provide a decent standard of living where the only precondition to aid is a 
certain income level. Such poverty legislation is simply the redefinition 
of incentives to individuals; an expansion of the choices regarding 
resources available to individuals to meet their wants and needs. That 
more people are poor today than in 1965 is not due to reduced care taken to 
remain employed, but to the value of social welfare legislation to 
individuals who are making choices about how to order their lives in the 
face of scarcity.
Charles Murray's work neatly lays out the simplicity, the 
inevitability, of higher poverty levels after the inception of new social 
welfare legislation: "When economic incentives are buttressed by social
norms, the effects on behavior are multiplied. But the main point is that 
the social factors are not necessary to explain behavior. There is no 
'breakdown of the work ethic' in this account of rational choices among 
alternatives. The choices may be seen much more simply...as the behavior 
of people responding to the reality of the world around them and making the 
decisions--the legal, approved, and even encouraged decisions--that
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maximize their quality of life" (Murray 1984, 162).6
In summary, the increase in poverty under legislation designed to 
reduce and even to eliminate poverty, was inevitable from a purely positive 
standpoint. "The current system of income transfers confronts the poor 
with perverse incentives that discourage self-help efforts in the short run 
and induces recipients to make decisions that retard their ability to 
escape poverty in the long run" (Gwartney and McCaleb 1985, 14).
Individuals seek to maximize their own well-being, and, given the choice 
between a time-consuming job which one might even dislike and an income 
earned through complete or near-complete leisure, the rational individual 
is going to choose the latter. "People who choose subsidized leisure over 
paid employment are responding rationally to the signals of a distorted 
market" (Barry 1985, 144).
Not only does the increase in transfers of income increase poverty, 
the use of income transfers tends to perpetuate poverty over time. Since 
the modern welfare system is an income redistribution system funded by 
income tax receipts, the chance to get off welfare and into a higher- 
paying job will not only bring about the loss of welfare benefits, but also 
the burden of income tax payments. "The American welfare system...erects 
...penalties in the worst possible way. When a low-income family earns an 
additional dollar of income, it is penalized in two ways. The family not 
only faces income and payroll taxes, it is also penalized by a reduction in 
welfare benefits...The combined effects of these ... penalties is an 
effective marginal tax rate...higher than that forced on any other income 
group" (National Center for Policy Analysis 1983, 10).
The second outcome which theory predicts will occur under a system of
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income redistribution is that of decreased productivity, which leads to a 
smaller income base to redistribute, and a change in incentives to invest 
in production.7 This prediction is wedded to the first outcome discussed 
above, in that the increase in poverty presupposes fewer people in the 
workforce.8 "Although the impact of the welfare state on the creation of 
income... cannot be measured with great precision...that impact is 
substantial... the amount of labor supplied is lowered, both because of the 
disincentive effect from the taxes imposed to finance the welfare state and 
from the negative effect the transfer programs have on the work incentives 
of the recipients" (Wagner 1989, 101-2).
The reason for this decline in market participation following the 
inception of a system of income redistribution is the decrease in control 
the individual possesses when evaluating his individual choices. Any 
system that imposes non-market burdens on individual effort must curtail 
individual effort. "People will not exert themselves for the 
redistributionist state, and not because they are selfish, but because they 
are rational. To act is to be purposeful; when a man doesn't even know 
what purpose his action has served, he can hardly be said to have acted at 
all; his effort has been rendered meaningless to him. He is, as the 
Marxists would say, alienated" (Sobran 1985, 41).
Despite the entry of greater numbers of women into the work force 
since 1965,9 which under a non-redistributory system would have expanded 
the production base in at least direct proportion to the amount of influx, 
the effect of income transfers on labor force participation has actually 
been negative.10 This is true despite the fact that much of the post- 
19603 effort to reduce poverty was aimed at providing jobs and job training
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to the poor.
Among the literature on the effect of transfer programs on 
productivity, it is amazing to see that virtually no one has been able to 
pinpoint the actual effect of aggregate transfers on productivity. Surely, 
such a measure would be very difficult to make, and would require a very 
constrained model, but such a measure could be pivotal in the debate over 
welfare reform. Rather than evaluating the effect of individual programs, 
a measure of the change in labor force participation would be a damning 
criticism of the entire welfare state, especially when the effects are 
multiplied over time.11 It is important to note here that the effect of 
War on Poverty programs on labor force participation was not debated in the 
literature on the value of that War. Rather, most theorists concerned 
themselves with the unemployment rate. However, "What was commonly called 
the 'unemployment' problem among the disadvantaged was largely a problem of 
[labor force participation]" (Murray 1984, 75).
Another surprising aspect of this decline in productivity is that 
consumers are not necessarily choosing a higher income when they elect to 
become welfare dependent. Since leisure is a consumers' good, its value to 
the consumer, based on individual subjective valuation of alternatives, 
might be greater than the value of working for a living. "Through either 
conscious decisions or the subtle influence of acculturation, untold 
numbers have simply substituted publicly provided income for privately 
earned income with the net effect of public transfers on their incomes 
being close to zero or worse" (Lee 1985, 29). What such a choice does is 
perpetuate the very condition income redistribution has sought to 
alleviate, and the effect on motivation derived from future gains from work
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is immeasurable. One aspect of the form of modern social welfare programs 
compounds this effect: "Most of our welfare programs were designed and
developed to take care of the needs of a particular poor segment of 
society, and often little or no thought seems to have been given to the 
effect of their interaction with other welfare or public assistance 
programs. The result is a cumulative negative effect on a poor person's 
incentive to work that is devastating" (Anderson 1978, 45).
The other side of the production picture yields a similar conclusion. 
Those who remain working, and therefore finance the expanding welfare 
state, face a redistribution of their property rights in order to provide 
for the disadvantaged. This redistribution of property rights must cause a 
disincentive to improve one's position: "the programs of the welfare state
will generally affect...initial distribution of income, as well as 
affecting the amount of total income generated within a society" (Wagner 
1989, 78). Further, "Although this redistribution [of property rights] 
might be defended by a social welfare function, still society's maximum 
capacity is reduced by resources devoted to transfer activity" (Anderson 
and Hill 1980, 7).
This effect on productivity and incentives to enter or stay in the 
labor force can be considered one of the most damning effects of 
government-mandated social welfare administration. Plausible arguments 
exist for keeping most welfare programs in the public sphere, ranging from 
the argument over equal access to entitlement to the supposed efficiency of 
public management of programs, but the fact that the productive base of the 
United States has eroded negates most if not all of these arguments.
"Under entitlements programs, recipients and potential recipients of aid
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have full freedom to exercise their preferences at will. In many cases, 
they can choose poverty over nonpoverty. Once this choice is made, the 
rest of society is presented with a welfare bill that it is obligated to 
pay. Thus, in a sense, under entitlement programs the preferences of the 
recipients determine the behavior (through the tax burden) of those who pay 
the bills....under the private-sector approach, welfare recipients must 
adjust their behavior to the preferences of the rest of society, not the 
other way around."12
This observation leads to the third expected outcome of income 
redistribution, that of a decline in private efforts toward the alleviation 
of poverty. Theories of the market and of human action that champion 
individual effort have long held, accurately, that private efforts are 
superior to public efforts, no matter what the good or service produced.
But "Unfortunately for the welfare system, Johnson's strategy of 
centralizing federalism, despite its initial impact on the country's social 
problems, undermined America's ability to address those problems over the 
long haul in creative, economical ways" (Butler and Kondratas 1987, 63).
Since the view that poverty relief is a public good and therefore 
must be provided by the government has gained favor in America, private 
efforts to aid the disadvantaged have been harshly criticized as being 
inefficient, discriminatory, and unduly harsh in their eligibility 
requirements. Johnson believed that private provision of social services 
could not alleviate the effects of pockets of poverty in poor states or 
solve the problem of structural unemployment. The view in the 1960s was 
that "Private charities [were] observed to be run, by and large, by 
benevolent, altruistic beings, compassionately aiding the generally needy
46
while public welfare agencies [were] observed to be run, by and large, by 
personal reformers and ex-altruists who suspiciously, and often 
begrudgingly, dole out money as well as services--often on the basis of a 
rigid, relatively cruel formula--to a motley crew of true indigents.... the 
latter may be an efficient institution when the former is an available 
substitute."13 Using this point of view, Johnson was able to push through 
massive expansion of public relief services. This legislation led to a 
change in the composition of private charitable and philanthropic efforts, 
making the potential for reform to a private system all the more difficult.
Was creating a public charity monopoly the best of all alternatives 
available in the 1960s? As with any government-mandated monopoly, the 
answer to this question must be no. John Goodman writes, "precisely 
because it faces no competition in the marketplace, the public charity 
monopoly can continue to spend money in wasteful and inefficient ways, to 
fail miserably in achieving its objectives, and to misbehave in other ways 
without fear of losing customers to a competitor."14 Without the challenge 
of out-competing competitors for subjective profits as a goal, the public 
charity monopoly can act on whatever basis its administrators choose. 
Historically, this basis has proven to be meeting the agendas of special 
interest groups, not the elimination of poverty.
Private sector charitable organizations often base their degree of 
involvement in social welfare on what they perceive the federal government 
to be doing for the poor. "There is growing evidence that private sector 
willingness to contribute to social welfare activities is conditioned by 
what the federal government is doing, or at least by what it is perceived 
to be doing by the private sector. Since 1955, charitable contributions by
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individuals have ranged between 2.5 and 3.0 percent of disposable 
income....In 1955, 22 percent of all private charitable contributions went 
to social welfare activities. By 1983, that figure had dropped to 11 
percent" (Goodman and Stroup 1986, 32-33).
Willingness on the part of the public to allow the government to 
continue to provide poverty relief is based on the ease with which 
government provides such service, with the taxpayer shielded from the 
effort of having to decide what and to whom relief should be provided. 
"Escapism is a natural response. The tax checks we write buy us, for 
relatively little money and no effort at all, a quieted conscience" (Murray 
1984, 235).
Though the level of private charitable contributions has not changed 
greatly, the composition of these contributions has undergone great 
upheaval. First of all, it is important to note that this change in 
private efforts began under the New Deal: "charitable donations underwent
a fundamental transformation during the period [of the 1930s]. They became 
less concerned with poverty and more concerned with health and social 
counseling" (Roberts 1984, 143). The government initially meant for 
private and public relief efforts to complement one another, with 
government providing a safety net of last resort to individuals unable to 
obtain private relief. What has evolved is essentially monopoly welfare 
provision by government, with a few private agencies (either traditional 
agencies that continued to provide relief, or new agencies that began after 
the monopoly welfare provision by government began) providing the social 
safety net of last resort.
The change on the part of private agencies from basic poverty relief
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to more esoteric social services has generated the notion that private 
provision can have no place in helping the disadvantaged attain their basic 
needs. This perspective makes reform of state welfare provision seem 
impossible, since the public now assumes that government provision exists 
because the private sector is unable to make provision for the poor. In 
Russell Roberts' study on the change in private charitable contributions 
since the 1930s, he found that the shift from private to public provision 
forced individuals to find a new outlet for their altruistic impulses: 
"Altruism goes far beyond a desire to raise the consumption level of the 
least fortunate. As government takes over this task our compassion turns 
to imperfect substitutes: counseling services, alleviating the diseases
that afflict children, and helping the less fortunate of other nations" 
(Roberts 1984, 146). Rearranging these altruistic outlets by reforming 
public provision might prove impossible when all that is offered in 
explanation for the change is an efficiency argument. Efficiency is pale 
compared to the stirrings of altruism. To tell Americans to turn away from 
social counseling and third world aid so that Americans may obtain basic 
relief, in order to take the responsibility away from government, rings 
hollow if one does not believe in limited government.
Another way private efforts have been manifested since the growth in 
public poverty relief is through "giving up political power to the poor 
....The most striking observation to social welfare historians is the 
dramatic change in the twentieth century from charity bestowed on the poor 
by wealthy benefactors to demands for charity by a politically active 
poor."15 Perhaps this is another means of quieting individual conscience, 
or it might be an outcome of the fight for egalitarianism. Whatever the
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case, political activism by the poor, who are bestowed with political power 
by frustrated altruists, can only entrench the welfare state more firmly.
The monopoly provision of relief services by the state has done more 
than merely crowd out private relief services. The expansion of the 
welfare state has led to overprovision of relief services. This 
overprovision of welfare services is caused by the nonspecific nature of 
War on Poverty programs. If the government provides relief to some 
individuals who fall below the poverty line, it must then provide relief to 
all individuals who fall below the poverty line. If the government adjusts 
the poverty line to account for changes in inflation, it must adjust 
benefits to all recipients for the same reason. This leap-frogging of 
provisions leads to an ever broader constituency, which leads inevitably to 
overprovision of relief services. However, overprovision of relief 
services does not imply that these services reach the specific people they 
are meant to reach. Perhaps a better way to describe the situation is 
overallocation for the provision of public relief, but without alleviating 
the poverty. "One of the most astonishing and little-known facts about the 
welfare state is what a miserable job it does in [getting aid to people who 
need it most]. Amazingly, 41 percent of all poverty families receive no 
means-tested benefit of any kind from the government. Yet more than half 
of all the families who do receive at least one means-tested benefit are 
not poor."16 This is despite the explosion in the number of available 
programs for the poor in the middle of this century. ("When President 
Eisenhower left office in early 1961, there were somewhere around forty 
major domestic programs. When Nixon took office there were over 400" 
[Anderson 1978, 7]). Many of these programs were put in place to try and
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stop the leakage of needy people from the system, and to attempt to appease 
new and stronger special interest groups.
It is to these interest groups that I now turn, since growth in 
interest group influence upon the government is the fourth and final 
predicted outcome of income redistribution. Within this outcome is the 
transformation of social welfare administration from one based on cash 
grants to one based on provision of benefits in-kind: "while cash
transfers to the poor increased 402 percent from 1965-1981, in-kind 
transfers to the poor increased by 5,226 percent over the same period" (Lee 
1985, 23-24). Dwight Lee (1985, 32) calls the political support of these 
obviously counterproductive programs "the political success of economic 
failure." An apt description.
The growth in special interest influence in the United States is 
considered one of the most ironic outcomes of the War on Poverty. "As 
efforts to combat poverty accelerated, a peculiar thing occurred. The 
harsh criticism of government efforts to reduce poverty that were prevalent 
in the early 1960s did not diminish. In fact, after the federal government 
officially declared war on poverty, the criticism of welfare seemed to grow 
in step with the proliferation of antipoverty programs" (Anderson 1978, 16- 
17).
The use of special-interest agendas has replaced the use of social 
engineering for expanding the welfare state. A special interest agenda can 
be much more subtle than a broad, obvious use of social engineering 
tactics, and has proved much more effective. The use of social engineering 
fell out of favor with the American people by the late 1970s because "the 
promises and hopes of twenty years of active federal government [had] not
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been fulfilled" (Glazer 1984, 94).
The growth of special-interest tactics is a direct result of the 
changes in the Constitution that were described earlier. As was said 
earlier, the door was opened to reinterpretation of property rights and the 
redistribution of earned income. Wagner writes, "With the erosion of 
constitutional limits on the ability of the legislature to legislate, a 
market for legislation emerges, and the legislation becomes an area in 
which wealth is transferred from losing to winning interest groups.... The 
result of such tax-transfer politics is a destruction of potential wealth; 
people's energies are turned away from productive activities into various 
transfer-seeking activities" (Wagner 1989, 179).
The use of special interest politics since the inception of the War 
on Poverty has evolved partly into the huge welfare bureaucracy which 
simply aims at staying in place, not at ending poverty. The poverty issue 
presented an opportunity to gain political power to elicit transfers of 
income, and the continued existence of poverty is being used to maintain 
this power. "'The poor' are to liberalism roughly what 'The Proletariat' 
is to Communism--a formalistic device for legitimating the assumption of 
power. What matters, for practical [left] liberals, is...that a huge new 
class of beneficiaries has been engendered--beneficiaries who vote, and who 
feel entitled to money that must be taken from others" (Sobran 1985, 40). 
Those who act as advocates for the poor have a vested interest in 
maintaining poverty, in order to maintain their livelihood. This 
maintenance of poverty includes keeping the existing poor below the poverty 
line as well as discovering new instances of poverty.
Two types of interest groups are most concerned with the perpetuation
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of poverty: the group that comprises providers of in-kind benefits to the
poor, and the welfare bureaucrats themselves. I will look at each of these 
two groups in turn.
The rise of in-kind benefits over cash grants was an answer to the 
prayers of advocates who depend on the poor to stay in business. "Official 
measurements of poverty count only money income, and ignore in-kind 
benefits such as medical care, food stamps and public housing. By spending 
ever-increasing amounts of money on in-kind...benefits, instead of cash 
benefits, the welfare establishment has managed to make welfare 
increasingly attractive without disqualifying recipients by endangering 
their status as 'poor'" (Goodman and Stroup 1986, 3). In the extra- 
Constitutional environment created by the expansion of the welfare state, 
this maintenance of the poor by use of services instead of cash grants is 
evidence of the existence of a third economic sector, beyond that of 
production and distribution: "When the State takes from Peter and gives to
Paul it is effecting a separate distribution process. Here, there does 
exist a process separate from production and exchange, and hence the 
concept [of redistribution of income] becomes meaningful" (Rothbard 1977, 
28) .
Those who provide the services comprised by in-kind benefits 
constitute some of the most powerful interest groups in politics today. 
These in-kind benefits include government-subsidized housing, food and 
nutrition programs, and medical care. The services that come under these 
headings are run by professionals who make the rational decisions to 
attempt to reduce the competition they face in the market. By finding a 
way to ensure themselves an income by becoming part of the public charity
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monopoly, these providers are rescued from the ravages of capitalism. In 
addition, just as the public charity monopoly itself is free from the need 
to provide the best service because it is a government-mandated monopoly, 
the in-kind benefit providers are free to provide quality of service that 
is below competitive levels. However, the in-kind providers do engage in 
their own form of competition: "Just as the market process will often
operate to erode the effectiveness of state policies that on the surface 
would appear to transfer income to people with low incomes, so too will 
competition among potential recipients often operate to erode the 
effectiveness of programs. Such competition can make it difficult, if not 
impossible, for the state to act charitably" (Wagner 1989, 59).
The interest group represented by the welfare bureaucrats, the second 
of the two special-interest groups concerned with the perpetuation of 
poverty, is made up of more than five million public and private workers.
A most ironic aspect of the growth of the welfare bureaucracy is that in 
its most aggregate measure, (when it includes all persons drawing from the 
welfare pool), it consists of about one-fifth of the population of the 
United States. When President Johnson declared war on poverty, he referred 
to another one-fifth of the population-- that of those living below the 
poverty line. Therefore, there has ensued a doubling of the number of 
persons who depend on the government for their livelihood--one-fifth (at 
least) under welfare legislation, and one-fifth who administer that 
legislation--forty percent of the population living in the government's 
back pocket.
These bureaucrats work closely with the providers of in-kind 
benefits. "Great Society coalitions have protected themselves...by
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ensuring that constituencies within and outside government work together 
closely.... the process by which pressure for government action comes from 
within government agencies themselves, generated by technical experts who 
see their role as advancing government action to achieve reforms. Armed 
with data they themselves generated and working with coalition allies, 
social services professionals have been able to build momentum for first 
establishing and then expanding social programs" (Butler and Kondratas 
1987, 23). Therefore, the presence of this strong welfare coalition, aimed 
at preservation of its livelihood, forms the linchpin of the modern welfare 
state. Even if these professionals know that their presence is not really 
helping the poor, they will do what they can to keep their jobs. "Social 
welfare professionals turn out to be disturbingly like their counterparts 
in the defense industry. Imagine a professional human services provider 
arguing that we need less spending on welfare or that his work would be 
better undertaken by a volunteer" (Butler and Kondratas 1987, 21-22). 
Therefore, any attempt at welfare reform must concentrate on the welfare 
state-special interest coalition, and must provide solutions that put this 
coalition ahead of all other concerns, whether this is the moral, logical, 
efficient approach or not.
What special interest politics represents is a culmination, a fusion 
of all the inevitable outcomes under income redistribution: an increase
and perpetuation of poverty, a decline in productive activity, and a 
decline in private sector efforts aimed at relief.
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NOTES TO SECTION 2
1. Arthur M. Okun discusses at length the theory of the "leaky bucket" of 
legislation. His thesis is that, even if programs do not attain all they 
are meant to attain--if some of the provision "leaks out" of the system 
before it reaches those for whom it is intended--as long as most of the 
provision gets to the intended, there occurs a net benefit to society. See 
Arthur M. Okun, Equality and Efficiency (Washington: The Brookings 
Institution, 1975).
2. Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Economy, Elections, and Public Opinion," In 
John Moore, ed., To Promote Prosperity (Stanford: Hoover Institution 
Press, 1984), 405.
3. According to Wagner, "since the mid-1960s, expenditures on the welfare 
state have grown about 150 percent as fast as...GNP. In the process, 
spending on these programs has more than doubled as a share of aggregate 
output." (To Promote the General Welfare, 10). Further, Jonathan Hobbs 
estimates that, from 1960 to 1982, "average annual welfare expenditure 
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Section 3: Public Changes Suggested to Solve
Admitted Problems In the Social Welfare Structure
The individual citizen must decide, according to his individual 
principles, whether or not the functioning of the government he lives under 
is proper or not. If it is, he must seek to keep it that way, and to 
question any proposed changes that threaten to move the government outside 
of its intended purpose. If it is not, the individual must do what is 
necessary to change the system. This responsibility faces all men daily, 
yet it has not been attended to in the United States in recent years. If 
the present welfare state is unconstitutional or illegal, then citizens 
must be willing to call for change.
In light of these observations, what has been done to reform welfare 
administration in the United States? First of all, in discussing welfare 
reform, it is clear that it would make no sense to preserve the liberty of 
the irresponsible at the expense of the liberty of the responsible. Bill 
Jordan writes, "the state has a duty to regulate itself, its own 
institutions and its processes, to protect citizens against arbitrary 
authority, and to give them opportunities to influence its policies and 
decisions....One of the most important issues of the twentieth century...is 
whether the state also has a responsibility to protect all its citizens 
from harm by guaranteeing that their basic needs will be met in all 
circumstances, through the provision of social services" (Jordan 1987, 98). 
Therefore, a major tenet of welfare reform must be to reasser 
Constitutional rights for all citizens, and to put an end to extra- 
Constitutional rights. In doing so, the government can and will be 
minimalized, and it will be nearly impossible to maintain cases of unequal 
liberty.
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Second, suggestions for reform of social welfare administration must 
be distinguished from suggestions for privatization of social welfare 
services. The whole idea of reform of existing public welfare institutions 
demonstrates a belief in the inherent goodness of a method or an aim that 
has been implemented poorly. The Great Society was a essentially a reform 
of New Deal programs, not a revolution in ideology. "The standard approach 
to the economic analysis of public policy has assumed--tacitly if not 
explicitly--that while the formation of public policy may confront problems 
of knowledge, it does not confront problems of incentive" (Wagner 1989,
55). This conventional wisdom that assumes government provision as well- 
intentioned though not well-implemented has led to a great deal of rhetoric 
over the shape reform must take. Rarely is the issue of removing 
government from the realm of welfare given much credence. Therefore, this 
section on public welfare reform will operate from the point of view held 
by reformists, that of the necessity of maintaining public provision. In 
doing so, I will attempt to evaluate the reform proposals in the cold light 
of logic, rather than from the point of view of one who simply wishes to 
scrap the whole process.
Martin Anderson writes of two criteria which are necessary to a 
successful program of welfare reform. "First, it must be built on a clear 
and accurate perception of the current nature of the welfare system in the 
United States; and second, it must be guided by a deep appreciation for the 
attitudes of Americans toward caring for people who cannot care for 
themselves" (Anderson 1978, 153-54). These simple guidelines, which form 
the base of any system of relief aimed at relief per se and not at the 
acquisition of power or maintenance of the bureaucracy, will be used to
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evaluate the actions of welfare reformers since the inception of the War on 
Poverty.
The first guideline for evaluating reform--the clear and accurate 
perception of the current state of public welfare administration in the 
United States, is an important consideration, as outlined earlier, because 
much of the policy analysis in this country is based on imperfect 
statistical measures of the amount of poverty in the United States. 
"According to the Census Bureau, 12.3 percent of all Americans [were poor 
in 1977], Revised, more accurate estimates show that if you also take into 
account the value of the nonmoney income received by poor people...the 
poverty count drops to as low as three percent. In effect, the executive 
branch of the federal government has been telling us that there is four 
times as much poverty as there really is. And laws have been passed and 
money has been appropriated and welfare programs have been implemented 
based on this 'evidence'" (Anderson 1978, 25). Since most if not all 
evaluations of the modern welfare state rely on these statistics as a 
measure of the nature of poverty in the United States, one must assume that 
any reform proposal that does not re-evaluate the statistics cannot be in 
the best interests of reform.
Welfare reform efforts since the 1960s have concentrated mainly on 
the expansion rather than the curtailment of welfare provision made under 
the programs started during the Johnson administration. This is due in part 
to the hold that the welfare bureaucracy and welfare special interest has 
over any reform legislation, a fact well known within the political 
community, if not among most learned people. "[W]ide divergences of 
opinion exist on the overall shape of welfare reform. Most outside groups
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act as advocates for relatively well-defined interests, and rather than 
having to cope with the difficulty of coming up with a political consensus, 
they urge Congress to give their positions special consideration" (Weil 
1978, 15). Current reform rhetoric is not different from the rhetoric of 
the War on Poverty, which sought an expansion of the bureaucracy with 
little regard for the conquest of poverty. Although all reform efforts do 
not necessarily concentrate on the welfare bureaucracy, reformers generally 
concede that it is the welfare bureaucracy that is crucial to legitimating 
reform. "[F]ocusing on the behavior of public servants within the current 
political and legal framework is not sufficient for understanding and 
conducting public affairs. It can serve to block basic reform which is 
itself not impossible despite the motivations of public servants" (Machan 
1988, 126). Therefore, economic analysis of public policy reform must not 
discount the motivations of those who comprise the welfare bureaucracy, but 
reform cannot be successful if it concentrates on the bureaucracy and 
nothing else. "[B]etter public policy requires only an improved analysis 
of the various consequences of the measures under consideration. Within 
this context, the agenda of policy analysis is understandably dominated by 
efforts to develop better information about the consequences of different 
policy options. But once it is recognized that the formation of public 
policy also depends on what incentives policymakers have and how their 
incentives may differ under different regimes.... analyzing the strength of 
the incentives to create and utilize that knowledge is also of major 
consideration" (Wagner 1989, 55).
Reform efforts have been continuous since the inception of the War on 
Poverty: "President Johnson made the War on Poverty his major domestic
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thrust. President Nixon proposed a 'Family Assistance Plan' as his 
domestic policy centerpiece. George McGovern tried to get his campaign 
moving in 1972 by proposing $1,000 a year for everyone.... President Ford 
tried to develop a [reform] plan in 1974, and President Carter, on taking 
office in 1977, quickly made welfare reform one of his first domestic 
priorities" (Anderson 1978, 67-68). Further, President Reagan spent a good 
deal of his time in office trying to curtail social spending on 
entitlements while refusing to countenance any reduction in social 
insurance programs. I will discuss in turn the attempts of each president 
since Johnson to reform social welfare administration.
The cornerstone of Nixon's reform attempts was the Family Assistance 
Plan (FAP), penned by Senator Daniel Moynihan, who was director of Nixon's 
Urban Affairs Council, a domestic cabinet of sorts. Nixon, in his 1968 
campaign, had spoken out harshly against the programs of the Great Society. 
Upon entering office, President Nixon at first set out to dismantle the War 
on Poverty programs, then turned around and introduced the FAP in 1970.
The FAP was a sort of negative income tax (to be discussed later in this 
section). The FAP sought to include the working and nonworking poor under 
the federal relief umbrella, and was meant to replace Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children. Congress opposed the FAP: liberals believed it to be
too stingy in its level of support and too harsh in its work requirements, 
and conservatives opposed it as the embodiment of a guaranteed income. The 
bill was defeated, but President Nixon was still successful in expanding 
the welfare state. In 1972, Supplemental Security Income (SSI) was 
introduced to guarantee a minimum income, as a matter of right, to the 
elderly, blind, and disabled. SSI was structured as a negative income tax,
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and replaced all state-run programs for the aged, blind, and disabled. 
Further, food stamp legislation was expanded in 1974 to emulate a 
guaranteed income. Food stamps now went to the poor and the near-poor who 
otherwise did not qualify for any categorical assistance. From the 1974 
expansion on, food stamps were provided to anyone whose income was 
determined to be a substantially limiting factor in the attainment of an 
adequate diet.
When Gerald Ford took over the presidency following Nixon's 
resignation, reform remained in political good favor, although Ford himself 
made no major changes to the system. "The reelection of Richard Nixon in 
1972 reactivated some half-hearted efforts to resurrect a major welfare 
reform plan, but the memories of the Family Assistance Plan and the 
developing Watergate scandal effectively combined to abort them....Caspar 
Weinberger, whom Nixon had appointed Secretary of Health, Education, and 
Welfare [now Health and Human Services] in early 1973, was kept on by 
President Ford, and was apparently persuaded by the [Health, Education, and 
Welfare] professionals that the potential benefits of radical reform 
outweighed its intractable difficulties" (Anderson 1978, 10).
President Carter entered office as an advocate of incremental, as 
opposed to sweeping, reform. The existing Congress pushed for incremental 
reform because "one advantage of incremental reform was the possibility of 
proceeding without everybody involved being in agreement on the final form 
of the system" (Weil 1978, 15). Carter's contribution to the welfare 
reform debate was his 1977 Program for Better Jobs and Income. It was 
generally believed that Carter was attempting to overcome the problems 
imposed by earlier legislation that had undermined individual productivity.
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However, some believe that Carter had nothing to do with the drafting of 
the legislation, and that he knew little of the nature of the welfare 
bureaucracy. "Even before the Administration's proposals were made public, 
there had been reports indicating that the President had not fully grasped 
the complexity of welfare reform and that he had accepted work done by HEW 
without understanding its i m p l i c a t i o n s I  believe all of us should be 
wise to face the fact that the overwhelming majority of the personnel who 
put the plan together in the Department of [Health, Education, and Welfare] 
were here before President Carter came on the scene and they will be there 
after he is gone,' said Senator Long. Senator Moynihan was even more 
outspoken, 'The bill we received...was not drafted by the President... It 
was drafted by the bureaucracy'" (Weil 1978, 97-98). Neither the Program 
for Better Jobs and Income, nor subsequent compromise bills that changed 
its composition slightly, were passed under Carter. What is important to 
note here is that it was clear that the bureaucracy was in charge of 
welfare reform, no matter who presented proposed legislation to Congress.
The consensus that came out of the proposed reforms under presidents 
Nixon and Carter was clear: "in the current system there were incentives
to family break-up and reduced work effort, so that any change in the 
system towards a more uniform support of working and non-working poor 
families...would require improvement. These were the underlying 
assumptions of the reforms proposed by the Nixon and Carter administrations 
and they were rarely challenged. What was challenged was whether 
sufficiently strong incentives to increased work effort could technically 
be built into reform..." (Glazer 1984, 84).
This observation leads right into the intent of welfare reform under
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President Reagan. "The Reagan administration's ideology was against 
confidence in the capacity of a central human wisdom incarnated in 
government, to plan for and manage the economy, and to cope successfully 
with the problems of the poor and the unfortunates in a complex industrial 
society" (Glazer 1984, 78). Rather than intending to expand welfare 
provision, Reagan sought a curtailment of social welfare administration. 
"The Reagan administration...represented the complete acceptance of the New 
Deal welfare state [based on the federal safety net and contributory 
insurance programs] but not of the Great Society welfare state [based on 
tacit income redistribution]" (Glazer 1984, 97). The overall tone of 
welfare reform under Reagan was a call for the return to federalism, 
despite the fact that "a major contemporary economic argument against 
federalism and state power built into the Constitution is that there are 
certain social problems that must be dealt with at the national level, 
because they affect various parts of the country differently....This is an 
economic argument for 'nationalizing the problem of poverty,'" writes 
Nathan Glazer, "But...these arguments... are anchored in analyses that no 
longer hold. There has been a sharp reduction in regional disparities in 
income in recent decades" (Glazer 1984, 92-93).
In 1981, the Reconciliation Act was passed. This piece of 
legislation was aimed at broad cuts across the federal budget. Actual 
reductions in welfare program expenditures were relatively modest, though 
publicized reaction to the cuts indicated differently. The budget cuts, 
passed in 1981 and imposed on the 1982 budget, were a very small percentage 
of non-defense spending. Estimates of the actual cuts vary, but "the 
Congressional Budget Office estimated cuts of $35.2 billion in outlays
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[from a total budget of $725 billion, meaning proposed cuts amounted to 
less than five percent of the total budget]" (Glazer 1984, 79). Welfare 
programs actually cut, of course, did not include the political hot 
potatoes like Social Security or Medicare. "[T]he problem was not only 
massive political resistance but the simple technical difficulties of 
finding a mode of reimbursement that did not rise very rapidly and did not 
threaten the quality [of service]....So the reduction, perhaps a modest 4 
percent of the total budget, could rise to a striking percentage of these 
parts of the budget that were not as well defended.... as it turned out, 
those [cuts were made to] programs most focused on the poor" (Glazer 1984, 
80). This meant that the cuts, as minor as they were, were made to non­
contributory programs such as AFDC, Medicaid, and food stamps. Glazer goes 
on to point out that "[i]n total, even those cuts could not be called 
massive, particularly since one could expect cuts in some programs to show 
up as unexpected increases in others....And...to my knowledge no one [as of 
1984] has yet sorted out the overall effects, post-budget, of even the cuts 
of FY 1982, and whether the cuts estimated on the basis of 1981 action were 
'really' there after the end of FY 1982. (This, for example, would involve 
sorting out the effects of the recession, which made many more eligible, 
from the effects of the reduction of eligibility ceilings, or changes in 
rules, in AFDC and food stamps.)" (Glazer 1984, 81). When is a cut not a 
cut? When it cannot be found, much less measured.
Therefore, President Reagan was no more successful than his 
predecessors at reforming the welfare state. His rhetoric though, 
bedazzled most critics. "There is...[a] sense in which many of the changes 
in social programs could be said to be more moderate than the uproar over
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the cuts indicated. Many of the proposed and enacted program cuts...were 
seen by independent, or at any rate not sharply partisan, policy analysts 
as valuable in themselves.... In the elan of the Reagan victory and with a 
stunned Congress, a great deal could be done that earlier administrations, 
even with a more positive outlook on the governmental activity, wished to 
do but could not" (Glazer 1984, 81). Reagan, then, did not take full 
advantage of his ability to reform the system.
The practical outcome of the Reagan Administration welfare reform was 
not a major reduction of welfare expenditures, but renewal of a commitment, 
at least in rhetoric, to acceptance of the idea that the market provides 
the greatest incentive for individuals who seek wealth. This commitment, 
however, was not manifested in any great degree of deregulation that would 
be necessary to the efficient functioning of the market.
The above analyses of the nature of welfare reform since 1965 show 
that little has been done to check the growth of the welfare state, and 
that much has been done to try and install a system of explicit income 
redistribution in the United States.
The idea behind explicit income redistribution is the desire for a 
guaranteed minimum income for all citizens. This idea formed the base for 
most of the reform proposals since the 1960s: "a number of economists and 
social science theorists have put forth plans for radically altering the 
welfare system of the United States from its current purpose of helping 
needy people to guaranteeing incomes for everyone. There has been a long 
string of specific proposals, including Milton Friedman's negative income 
tax (NIT) (1962), Robert Theobald's guaranteed income (1965), James Tobin's 
guaranteed income plan (1965), R.J. Lampman's subsidy plan (1967), Edward
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Schwartz's guaranteed income (1967), the NIT plan of President Johnson's 
Income Maintenance Commission (1969), President Nixon's FAP (1969), [and] 
George McGovern's $1000-a-year plan (1972)....The plans provided for 
minimum income guarantees ranging from $1500 to $6000 a year for a typical 
family of four. The effective marginal tax rates ranged from 50 percent to 
well over 100 percent. The costs of the plans ranged from several billions 
to over $50 billion a year. All would have added tens of millions of 
people to the welfare roles" (Anderson 1978, 133-34).
The NIT is the most enduring structure of the various comprehensive 
welfare reform proposals. The acceptance of NIT rhetoric, as opposed to 
outright guaranteed income rhetoric, might be based on the fact that NIT 
still sounds like implicit income redistribution, although it is not.
Simply put, "the basic idea of a negative income tax is to use the 
mechanism by which we now collect tax revenue from people with incomes 
above some minimum level to provide financial assistance to people with 
incomes below that level" (Friedman 1983, 349). All collection and 
distribution would be federally-run, and is usually stipulated to be 
unified with the present tax system. "Unified tax and transfer mechanisms 
can achieve both administrative economies and reduced distortion of 
incentives by imposing constant marginal rates over the range of negative 
and positive tax liabilities" (Friedman 1983, 622). The NIT is proposed as 
a replacement of all present social welfare programs, and the NIT is 
expected to encourage a decline in the loss of productive activity by 
reducing the marginal tax rate on benefits to some level below 100 percent, 
thus allowing individuals to work and yet still be eligible for relief.
To some, such a program offers clear gains in the ever-important (to
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welfare supporters) areas of equity and efficiency. In addition, this 
theory provides some greater measure of dignity, in that it proposes to 
eliminate the means test used under present legislation, since the filling 
out of a tax return is all that is necessary to bring about distribution.
Whenever the debate over public welfare reform heats up, the NIT gets 
brushed off and re-proposed. However, the NIT scheme contains major flaws, 
some of which have helped to bar its inception. The first flaw lies within 
the income concept. Although it is fairly straightforward to calculate the 
declared money earnings of individuals, there has been some debate over how 
capital assets and undeclared assets might be measured for redistribution 
(which is problematic in that it encourages underreporting). This dilemma 
has not been solved to any degree of satisfaction in the literature on the 
NIT.
A second flaw in the NIT proposal involves the accounting period over 
which income flows are to be measured and taxes taken in or paid out. If 
the period is annual, large disparities from year to year will cause 
accounting difficulties, especially in the case of reimbursements on 
overpayments based on projected income. Considering the fact that the 
present welfare system is overloaded with bureaucratic red tape, and that 
it has generated underreporting of income and other means of cheating the 
system, one must wonder precisely how overpaid citizens would be convinced 
to pay the government back. Some suggestions have been made to integrate 
tax and transfer systems as an extension of current withholding programs 
for the regularly employed, but little has been said about how this would 
be done for the irregularly employed, a more likely status for workers at 
the minimum income borderline.
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A third flaw in the NIT proposal has been given the least 
consideration, yet its presence undermines even the best intentions of 
legislators. This is the problem of time constraints. While the merits of 
income redistribution can be argued back and forth, an overriding 
consideration is whether such a system would have a built-in time 
constraint or whether it would become a permanent federal institution like 
so many other programs initiated at times of great need and somehow never 
put to rest? Is NIT intended to be a permanent part of the United States 
economy, or will its purpose be to end poverty, as Johnson intended, and 
then fade away? Friedman appears to advocate the former: "This plan is
intended to replace completely our present programs of direct relief--Aid 
to Dependent Children, public assistance, and so on. For the first year or 
two, it might cost slightly more than these programs--because it is so much 
more comprehensive in coverage. But, as the incentive effects of the plan 
started to work, it would begin to cost far less than the present exploding 
direct assistance programs that are creating a permanent class of people on 
welfare" (Friedman 1983, 350). However, the NIT proposal does not 
eliminate the potential for a permanent underclass, since the opportunity 
for individuals to make efforts to stay just below the minimum income 
standard is very high, and the longer the legislation stayed in place, the 
more intractable this problem would become. "The concept of a basic income 
requires a major change in social attitudes--one which would be 
particularly difficult to achieve in institutions based on the roles of 
industrial employment. For instance, it requires that people think 
primarily of what is a fair income for an individual or a household, rather 
than a fair wage or salary. People would think of wages no longer in terms
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of subsistence, but in terms of their additional income potential above the 
subsistence that would be provided by the basic income" (Jordan 1987, 160). 
As was pointed out in an earlier section, welfare recipients have been 
known to choose to stop working and go on welfare even when the change in 
their income was a negative one, because of the high subjective value of 
leisure to most individuals.
Overall, one has to wonder how anyone could seriously propose a 
cardinal comparison of total well-being among individuals and then try to 
find a way to make that well-being equal among all individuals. Well­
being is a completely subjective valuation, and has always been so, despite 
the hopes and efforts of legislators. But the intention of all guaranteed 
income schemes, including the NIT, is an objective provision of well­
being.
There is absolutely no proof that guaranteed income schemes can 
provide any better means of eliminating poverty than can present methods, 
and guaranteed income might indeed exacerbate the problems that are 
inevitable under income redistribution. "During the late 1960s and early 
1970s there were six major guaranteed income experiments conducted by the 
federal government. The results of these experiments varied from case to 
case, but a rough summary of the results is as follows: male head-of-
households reduced their work effort by five percent. Female head-of- 
households reduced their work effort by eight percent. Wives reduced work 
efforts by 22 percent; dependents by 46 percent.... Part of the reason for 
reduced work incentives is that it is practically impossible to construct a 
welfare system that does not penalize the welfare recipient who earns more 
in the marketplace" (National Center for Policy Analysis 1983, 10).
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Unfortunately, bureaucrats have helped to foster a belief in only 'minor' 
losses of production as a tradeoff for the 'major' potential relief that 
would be given under guaranteed income.
Fortunately for all advocates of the free market process, the NIT and 
other guaranteed income schemes have found little public support.
"Although variants of the NIT were proposed to Congress by Presidents Nixon 
and Carter, it is safe to say that the negative income tax has had only one 
major constituency--economists. The public strongly rejects one key 
element of a NIT, the minimum income guarantee. Even politicians who have 
embraced the idea insist on adding features to the plan that are not part 
of the original conception, such as mandatory work requirements or 
guaranteed public jobs. Though a cash NIT has never been adopted, the 
debate over NIT affected the terms of the welfare reform debate" (Burtless 
1990, 68).
With this analysis of the NIT and general guaranteed-income advocacy, 
I return to the original criteria for effective reform. None of the 
proposals for welfare reform that advocate an income guarantee are built on 
clear and accurate perception of the current nature of the welfare system 
in the United States. If they were, they would not advocate a broader 
program of welfare coverage, because of their inevitable negative effects 
upon the incentives of individuals to participate in the market process. 
Instead these programs would serve to spur people to become a further drain 
on the market process. A clear and accurate perception of the current 
nature of the welfare system in the United States can lead only to 
advocating reduction in the welfare state and a return to private provision 
of welfare relief.
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The second criterion for reform calls for an appreciation for the 
attitudes of Americans toward caring for people who cannot care for 
themselves. "The overwhelming majority of Americans favor government 
welfare programs for those who cannot care for themselves, while at the 
same time favoring large cuts in the welfare system....A guaranteed income 
is flatly opposed by a 2-to-l margin. Although welfare is generally seen 
to be a serious problem, it holds very low priority with the public 
relative to other problems facing the country" (Anderson 1978, 59). 
Therefore, the second criterion for successful welfare reform is also 
ignored by the guaranteed-income advocates.
The lack of realistic reform proposals leads one to conclude that all 
public reform efforts based on guaranteed income since the inception of the 
War on Poverty have been eminently defeatable, and will continue to be so 
until realistic proposals are made. These realistic proposals, however, 
may not come from the public sector: "a federally controlled and
administered welfare system has not and will not serve either the interests 
of the taxpayers or the needs of the poor. What is needed is a total 
redesign of public assistance policy and administrative structure" (Hobbs 
1982, 5-6). To allow welfare bureaucrats to redesign public assistance 
policy and administrative structure would be akin to allowing the fox to 
redesign the chicken coop. Therefore, the task of welfare reform lies in 
the hands of the public, and the structure must lean toward privatization.
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Section 4: Private Alternatives to Government 
Welfare Administration
This thesis has so far shown that the present state of monopoly 
welfare provision by the United States government is unconstitutional, 
inefficient, and antithetical to the principles of individual self- 
determination. This final section will concentrate upon the efforts of the 
private sector to make provision for the poor, and will show that private 
provision, divorced from government influence, is the only means for 
successfully providing services to the disadvantaged.
Murray Rothbard, in his usual, insightful way, writes,
"Economics...without engaging in any ethical judgement whatever, and 
following the scientific principles of the Unanimity Principle and 
Demonstrated Preference, concludes: (1) that the free market always 
increases social utility [by way of the 'Invisible Hand']; and (2) that no 
act of government can ever increase social utility.... Exchanges between 
persons can take place either voluntarily or under the coercion of 
violence. There is no third way. If, therefore, free market exchanges 
always increase social utility, while no coerced exchange or interference 
can increase social utility, we may conclude that the maintenance of a free 
and voluntary market 'maximizes' social utility (provided we do not 
interpret 'maximization' in a cardinal sense)" (Rothbard 1977, 29-30. 
Emphasis Rothbard's).
Comparatively more has been written about government welfare 
administration than has been written about private sector means of helping 
the disadvantaged. This is not necessarily unfortunate. Although it is 
generally believed by promoters of a free market that there are many 
private alternatives to public welfare administration, only those
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alternatives that grow out of a single base have a chance for survival in 
practice. That base is voluntary exchange. Any alternative to public 
social welfare administration that does not take into to account the 
stabilizing nature of voluntary exchange is doomed to fail on the free 
market, because, as I have just pointed out, the only alternative to 
voluntary exchange is coercion or violence, both of which are inherently 
unstable. Furthermore, "the possibility of 'government failure' as well as 
'market failure' must be considered. The private market may be faulty, but 
the government 'remedy' may be worse. The need is therefore to choose, not 
between alternative hypothetical ideal cases, but between alternative 
institutional arrangements as they would actually work in practice" 
(Rothbard 1977, 7). Therefore, the existence of a few feasible private 
alternatives to public welfare administration indicates that the 
institutional arrangement of a free market is structure enough, for the 
most part, to provide for the disadvantaged. What actually comprises these 
alternatives will be discussed later in this section.
Just as a positive analysis of public welfare administration was 
evidence enough to prove its inefficiency, the logical examination of 
private relief will demonstrate its supremacy in providing for the 
disadvantaged. The simple economic efficiency of the private provision of 
poverty relief should provide enough proof to understand the devastation 
wrought by blocking the inception of private provision and by maintaining 
public provision of welfare.
To study the concept of privatization, a definition is necessary: 
"Privatization means the transfer of government activities and assets to 
the private sector. It can be accomplished by selling an activity, by
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leasing it to the private sector, or even by giving it away" (Goodman 1985, 
101). There are general methods of privatization of government services 
that are in use today, including contracting-out, franchising, subsidizing, 
using regulatory and tax incentives, using vouchers, and the use of 
volunteers and self-help organizations. Before discussing those methods 
which apply to the privatization of social services, there are observations 
that can be made about the general case for privatization, and about 
historical attempts to prevent its inception.
The first observation about private provision of welfare services is 
that private provision is antithetical to such provision by the government. 
The means employed by private agencies have been called out-of-date because 
they continue to rely upon the behavioral approach to the presence of 
poverty (abandoned long ago by legislators), under which assistance is 
neither a duty on the part of the private provider, nor a right on the part 
of the poor. "Instead, charitable assistance is viewed as a tool that can 
be used intelligently, not only to provide relief but also to change 
behavior.... Private agencies usually reserve the right to reduce the level 
of assistance or withdraw assistance altogether if recipients do not show 
behavior changes."1 This behavioral approach was set aside by legislators 
in the 1960s, in order to maintain the dignity of welfare recipients and to 
remove the stigma of welfare. To legislators, unless welfare were made a 
right, relief might be provided capriciously.
However, as has been shown throughout this thesis, the public 
provision of welfare as the right of the individual has not ended poverty. 
Historically, private organizations have been the initiators of poverty 
relief, and have worked successfully to achieve their goals. John Goodman
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writes, "we tend to forget that throughout the nineteenth century, 
government was usually a latecomer in providing most public services-- 
entering the market only after private entrepreneurs had demonstrated that 
a demand for the service was there" (Goodman 1985, 113). This observation 
flies in the face of conventional wisdom about public welfare 
administration being a necessity because private provision had failed in 
the past, and supports the assertion that public welfare administration 
came into being for the benefit of administrators and not for the benefit 
of the poor.
Another observation regarding private provision of poverty relief is 
that private provision has proven to be more effective than public, 
especially when working within the confines of a free market. "The free 
market is superior to other systems in that it...provides less oppression, 
greater social harmony, more opportunity for the unskilled, more 
amelioration of poverty.... In addition, the private property-market society 
provides and processes information very quickly and efficiently and also 
provides a mechanism for change in the context of stability" (Hill 1985, 
7-8). Since government provision of any service presupposes a constrained 
or inefficient market, government provision must be less effective and less 
efficient than private provision of the same service. The market has 
responded to such inefficiency: "today, market provision is most common in 
areas where government provision becomes notoriously inadequate" (Goodman 
1985, 113).
In theory, private provision of relief services in a free market 
society comes about with relative ease and efficiency. However, in the 
United States today there exists a dichotomistic view of the economy, in
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which public and private sectors are wholly separate from one another. 
Therefore, although the market might be capable of providing a service more 
efficiently, if that service is considered a "public good," its provision 
is considered part of government's domain. A free market-limited 
government view of the economy does not foster such a dichotomy.
Generally, the role of government in a society which embraces the free 
market is that of contract enforcement and some measure of protection of 
citizens from coercion. There is no division between public and private 
goods here. However, under present conditions, the market provider of a 
relief service must overcome the dichotomy in addition to providing the 
service, which hampers the efficiency of the provider. "Public 
economies... are quite different from market economies. An entrepreneur who 
decides to engage in the delivery of a public service by relying upon 
theoretical market mechanisms is destined to failure. He must instead 
understand the logic of a public economy and learn to pursue his 
opportunities within those constraints. "The private delivery of public 
services is a different ball game from the private delivery of private 
goods and services."2 As long as such a point of view exists, the ease of 
market provision of welfare services is compromised.
However, this view of the public/private dichotomy is beginning to 
lose some credibility: "it is... skepticism with government--as well as the
desire to save money--that leads to the encouragement of private 
philanthropy and charity as a means of dealing with the problems of the 
poor," writes Nathan Glazer (1984, 94). But, he goes on to say, "It is no 
easy matter to encourage private philanthropy [because it] already exists 
on a greater scale in the United States than elsewhere. And reducing the
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rate of taxation is...an 'incentive' to provide less for charity, since the 
value of the tax exemption declines" (Glazer 1984, 94). As skepticism with 
government grows, as government debt and the welfare rolls expand in 
tandem, private provision of poverty relief will in all likelihood be given 
more credence and more leeway in the future.
Despite these observations, the presence of government-based 
criticism of private relief services has done a great deal to undermine 
public confidence in private agencies. A few basic arguments are used to 
lessen public confidence. First, government provision is hailed as 
superior to private provision because government is able to avoid the free 
rider problem, while private agencies cannot. In truth, government 
provision does not avoid the problem of free riders, (the case where 
individuals benefit from the actions and expense of others), but simply 
internalizes the cost of free riders. Internalizing cost is to welfare 
what closing loopholes is to tax increases --essentially calling the same 
phenomenon by two different names. Free riders under welfare legislation 
include those who lie about their income in order to be eligible and those 
who the government knows are eligible but who are given relief anyway. 
Arthur Okun discusses this inevitable problem that will occur under social 
welfare administration, under which any strivings for equality among 
citizens will forego some efficiency in administration, which allows some 
ineligible recipients to free ride upon the stipulations if the 
legislation. Costs are not internalized, they are paid, and gladly paid, 
so long as equality continues to be sought after (See Okun 1975).
Therefore, since the rhetoric surrounding internalization of the cost of 
free riders does not assume that no cost is involved, the free rider issue
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remains no matter who provides the relief service.
Another argument used to change public confidence toward private 
agencies is concerned with the progress of civilization, and the idea that 
since the Industrial Revolution the scale of poverty is so great as to 
dwarf the effects of any private relief effort. This argument does not 
discount pre-Industrial Revolution relief efforts on the part of private 
agencies, but points out that a progressive civilization must recognize the 
fact that such efforts are ineffective in a complex modern society. "Much 
of the contemporary criticism of the Invisible Hand theory is directed less 
to theoretical concerns and more to the alleged real-world deficiencies-- 
economic, political, and ethical--of a system based on the spontaneous 
interaction of basically selfish economic agents. The argument here 
concerns the need for state action to correct an unhampered market that 
would otherwise periodically produce mass unemployment [and] pockets of 
poverty amid affluence..." (Barry 1985, 143). However, Barry (1985, 143) 
goes on to say, "no other economic system has remotely approached 
capitalism in its productivity and ability to satisfy consumer wants." 
Therefore, the need for government intervention because of progress is not 
necessarily warranted, because the opportunity to remove oneself from a 
position of poverty is actually greater since the Industrial Revolution 
than it had been before.
The most successful argument used to turn public opinion against 
private provision of poverty relief is the argument for altruism- 
egalitarianism. "[M]uch of the growth of the federal government has 
resulted from decisions to provide private services at public expense. The 
rationale has been, implicitly more often than explicitly, that everyone
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benefits by having no one starve" (Savas 1977, 2). The use of the 
altruism-egalitarianism argument is what turns the needs of the poor into 
rights and entitlements that have I previously called extra-Constitutional. 
This argument has already been refuted above: The resulting welfare system
imposes a disincentive for individuals to participate in the market 
process, and therefore imposes too great a cost upon society.
Rather than completely suppressing private efforts, the government 
has encouraged private agencies to become a part of the welfare bureaucracy 
in a variety of ways. Herein lies the greatest difficulty to be overcome 
by privatization efforts, since this use of bribery robs private agencies 
of the incentive to produce their service on the market just as much as the 
provision of welfare to individuals robs them of their incentive to be 
self-sufficient.
The inclusion of private agencies in the public welfare monopoly was 
part of the War on Poverty legislation. "The Johnson Strategists were 
careful to incorporate nonprofit organizations into the Great Society 
structure, thereby giving private social welfare advocates and 
professionals a vested interest in the programs, while giving the false 
impression that social service had nothing to do with profit or personal 
gain. By 1980, according to an Urban Institute Study, some 58 percent of 
the revenues of nonprofit social service organizations was coming directly 
or indirectly from the federal government" (Butler and Kondratas 1987, 24). 
By making private agencies part of the War on Poverty, and turning public 
opinion against providers outside the public/private welfare coalition, 
legislators ensured continued support for welfare programs. "The 
incestuous relationship between nonprofit professionals and the federal
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government has not merely enhanced the coalitions supporting federal 
programs of dubious merit, it has also served to freeze out indigenous 
community-based 'competition' to those programs to the detriment of the 
population supposedly being helped" (Butler and Kondratas 1987, 24).
What such a perverse coalition accomplishes is encouragement of the 
worst aspects of each partner. Government provision, though inefficient, 
is perpetuated. Private agencies, though more efficient in theory, are 
encouraged to waste resources to maintain the coalition rather than to 
concentrate on providing the best service to their clients. "The idea that 
[voluntary] organizations should be encouraged to act 'in partnership with 
the statutory services' seems misguided.... If the virtues of the voluntary 
sector are connected with diversity and experiment, what is required is not 
state planning or 'partnerships,' but rather a policy that supports all 
groups that supply [so-called] public goods, irrespective of whether they 
happen to appeal to the government of the day" (Sugden 1986, 88-89).
In addition to the aforementioned effects, it is no secret that 
allowing government provision to continue even in the light of government 
inefficiencies works out to be easier for the individual citizen than 
individual efforts at trying to help the poor have been made out to be. 
"Even though more people shoulder the cost of a federal program, it is the 
amount coming out of each pocket that tends to matter politically" (Butler 
and Kondratas 1987, 22). This analysis shows that the compromise of 
liberty embodied in the existing welfare system is forged by believers in 
public provision who simply wish to maintain the welfare bureaucracy, the 
bureaucrats themselves who wish to keep their jobs, private agencies that 
are maintained by public funds, and taxpayers who are taught that the use
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of taxation to help the poor is more efficient and less painful than 
individual effort. These combined results create a strong front against 
free-market oriented private provision.
And yet, despite this depressing array of dubious social welfare 
achievements, a growing privatization movement exists. Despite the 
conventional wisdom which holds public welfare in high esteem, (or at least 
believes public provision of welfare to be the best of all alternatives), 
individuals and organizations still strive to provide relief services in 
the private sector. Faced with the aforementioned obstacles, the efforts 
of private agencies are that much more difficult, and any success is to be 
given more credence because of what must be overcome to provide relief 
services under the present conditions. "Although the state has instruments 
of compulsion at its disposal that people acting in their private 
capacities do not, the ability of the state to implement policy measures is 
nonetheless limited within a market economy. State policy may encroach in 
various ways on the principles of property and contract that underpin a 
market economy, but the participants in the economy will typically have 
wide latitude for negating those policy measures" (Wagner 1989, 57).
Indeed, the existence of a market economy in the United States, even though 
somewhat compromised by government interference, makes privatization 
efforts possible.
I now turn to actual privatization efforts. The major criterion I 
will employ to evaluate their feasibility for replacing government 
provision on a large scale is whether they are based on the concept of 
voluntary exchange. If a privatization effort is not based on voluntary 
exchange, it must rely on some sort of coercion to operate. Any basis in
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coercion is antithetical to the functioning of a free market, and therefore 
can be judged to be no improvement over the provision of welfare services 
by the state. This is a simple criterion, yet, "The truth is that 
economists do not understand how the voluntary [or private social service] 
sector works; we have been brought up on a theory that tells us it cannot 
work and we are only just beginning to face up to the fact that it 
nonetheless does" (Sugden 1986, 88). No more complicated criteria are 
necessary.
One of the main reasons that the private sector provision of relief 
services works is that the constituency the private sector faces is 
considerably smaller than that faced by the public sector. "Even when 
there is evidence of need, [private agencies] often seek to determine 
whether the potential recipient has access to other, untapped sources of 
assistance" (Goodman 1985, 25). This determination narrows the pool of 
potential recipients of private aid, and therefore reduces the capital 
needed for private agencies to help the disadvantaged. This is a simple 
starting point, and an efficient one from the standpoint of using 
resources, and yet it is systematically ignored by the bureaucracy.
Another reason private agencies begin with an advantage over public 
agencies is the narrowness of scope within which the private agency works. 
Most, if not all, private efforts are either state or locally based. This 
limited scope means that the customers of private relief agencies tend to 
be dealt with on a case-by-case basis, and evaluated from the point of view 
of state and local conditions, which means that provision will tend to fit 
the characteristics of the individual's life and community.
The most traditional of these privatization efforts is strictly not a
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privatization effort at all, but nonetheless serves as a viable private 
alternative to public welfare services. This is the realm of charity. A 
charity is any organization dispensing relief to the poor, :o the concept 
of charity will encompass more than one type of privatization effort. As a 
matter of fact, private efforts can be divided into two categories: simple
private charities which provide traditional relief services, and 
organizations which seek to take over those services government has 
dominated.
Peter Hill describes charitable agencies, many of which are run by 
religious organizations, as mediating organizations. "Given the rapidity 
of change possible in a market system, there is an important role for the 
Christian community [and the charitable community in general]. A private 
property society will need many mediating institutions to soften some of 
the abrupt and oftentimes harsh signals that come from the marketplace.... 
Thus a combination of a private property, market society overlaid with 
voluntary, non-market institutions provides an attractive combination of 
stability and change" (Hill 1985, 15). The charitable organization, funded 
by individual donations, has always served as a provider of relief to the 
disadvantaged. In the absence of government provision, those in need have 
found relief. "Where do people in need turn for help when they are not 
getting government assistance? They turn to private charities. Of all the 
shelters for the homeless in the United States, 94 percent are operated by 
churches, synagogues, nonreligious groups, and other voluntary 
organizations. The private sector is also very heavily involved in 
emergency food distribution. The Second Harvest Network, which operates 79 
of more than 300 food banks in the United States, distributes about 188
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million pounds of food each year, worth about $78 million."3 Typically, 
prior to the inception of large-scale welfare administration, the 
charitable organization was the first place to go when one was in need of 
aid and outside family or community assistance. This is still true today, 
but for the most part true only for the newly indigent. The typical long­
term welfare client today is a second- or third-generation recipient who 
seeks government assistance as a way of life.
According to my criterion for success, the private charity is a 
legitimate provider of private relief services. The private charity 
provides relief on its own terms, with clients given the option to take or 
leave the stipulations for aid. Therefore, the relationship between the 
charity and the disadvantaged is completely voluntary, with each 
participant in the exchange free to leave the transaction at any time. 
Should the recipient find the stipulations for aid to be against his 
wishes, he can refuse the aid and move on. The provider of aid can 
withdraw it at any time should the client not meet particular requirements, 
and the provider looks to the day when the client can be self-sufficient. 
"These [private charities] see independence and self-sufficiency on the 
part of their 'clients' as one of their primary goals."A Further, "Many 
private charities require that a caseworker and a recipient of aid 
establish a plan designed to move the recipient to a condition of self- 
sufficiency" (Goodman 1985, 19).
The providers of private charitable relief realize that at different 
times and during varied economic conditions, different people will find 
themselves in need of aid. This presupposes a constant stream of clients 
applying for charitable relief. Therefore, the efficient charity will work
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to move clients off the rolls in order to make room for new clients in the 
future. There is no need, nor is it in any way efficient, for charities to 
perpetuate the poverty of clients in order to remain in business and to 
maintain contributions. As a matter of fact, the charity that is not able 
to get clients to a level of self-sufficiency is essentially not a 
successful charity, and will lose donors as a result. Contributors will 
essentially vote with their feet like any consumers, and will take their 
contributions elsewhere if a charity is not successful in fulfilling their 
goals.
The organization and administration of charitable giving is in all 
respects superior to that of public social welfare administration, and 
avoids the pitfalls legislated into public welfare. "Because individuals 
differ, and because individual circumstances differ, it is only through a 
program of 'hands-on-management' of charitable giving that we can give 
relief without at the same time encouraging antisocial behavior" (Goodman 
1985, 19).
Organizations that rely on charitable contributions encompass most 
types of non-profit organizations. A major benefit of these locally-run 
organizations is their ability to react to changes in the environment and 
the availability of resources very quickly, and to move people through 
their organization, rather than to create a chronic class of recipients. 
What matters here is not so much the rate at which innovations in providing 
relief are made, as the process that determines which new ideas are adopted 
and which rejected. The market has traditionally been the best supporter 
of this weeding-out process. In addition, the voluntary/non-profit sector 
(like the private, profit-making sector), provides space for the emergence
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of new organizations in a way that the so-called public sector does not.
The case for the voluntary sector is that it provides an environment in 
which organizations tend to grow or decline according to the extent of 
correspondence between what they do and what individuals want to see done. 
(See Sugden 1986, 87).
Another advantage of the structure of the charitable organization is 
the way in which it is staffed, and the use it makes of donated gcods-in- 
kind. For the most part, charitable organizations rely on volunteer labor 
to distribute goods and services, and on the donation of food, clothing, 
and services to provide for their clients. By doing so, the charitable 
organization can use donations to aid clients directly, and to pay for a 
smaller staff to handle those parts of administration that are not handled 
by the volunteers. This keeps costs to a minimum, thus allowing fewer 
donated dollars to go further in aiding the disadvantaged.
The existence of charitable organizations is evidence enough that 
public provision might be unnecessary. A traditional argument against 
charitable organizations is the inability of small, less-well-funded 
organizations to handle the scope of post-Industrial Revolution poverty. 
Analyzed as they have been above, charitable organizations are capable of 
providing relief across a broad range of individuals and economic 
conditions. They can do so for the very reason that public provision 
cannot: by moving clients in and out efficiently, the private charitable
organization is able to do more with a smaller staff and fewer resources. 
Therefore, in the same way that traditional monetary theory proves that any 
money supply can be optimal, any number of charitable organizations might 
be optimal as long as they are able to respond freely to the communities
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they serve.
If charitable relief is not strictly a form of privatization but has 
the potential to completely replace public welfare administration, what are 
some examples of actual measures to privatize public social welfare 
administration? The voucher system and the system of contracting-out 
public services to private agencies are the two major alternatives that 
exist today.
"Vouchers are a 'demand side' strategy in which citizens (consumers) 
are given a coupon with monetary value that can be used toward the purchase 
of a public service" (Management Information Service 1984, 42). Once the 
consumer has made a purchase with the voucher, the recipient organization 
redeems the voucher to the issuing government agency for cash. Vouchers 
are deemed to be successful only for "private, marketable" goods 
(Management Information Service 1984, 43). Therefore, voucher advocates 
presuppose the maintenance of the public/private dichotomy.
The use of a voucher system puts some judgement over one's well­
being back in the hands of the consumer and assumes a necessity for 
providing information regarding choices facing the consumer. Under 
traditional systems of welfare subsidy, decisions about what the consumer 
can consume are made by the bureaucracy. For example, food stamps, which 
are essentially vouchers, cannot be used to buy anything except food. 
Secondly, they cannot be used to buy everything in the food store. The 
consumer choice is constrained by what the welfare bureaucracy has deemed 
to be good and bad choices for consumption. This is the reason that 
vouchers are distributed instead of cash being given to those eligible for 
assistance. "If straight money payments were provided to consumers, much
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might be used for personal goods. Vouchers help guarantee a certain 
minimum level will be spent for the desired service" (Management 
Information Service 1984, 43). Although vouchers allow consumers to choose 
among local agencies providing the good or service for which the voucher is 
issued, consumers still do not have freedom to choose as they wish. 
Furthermore, the cost of providing the service is maintained by the 
government. "In moving from governmental supply to a voucher system, the 
financial role of government is retained, but its role in direct production 
of a service is transferred to private firms, allowing consumer choice" 
(Management Information Service 1984, 43). Therefore, the privatization 
aspect of vouchers exists only for the delivery of the good or service, and 
does not represent complete privatization, for government retains control 
through service guidelines agencies must meet. Monetary control remains in 
the hands of government, and ultimate payment is levied on the taxpayer. 
Thus the voucher system does not solve the problems that exist today under 
government social welfare administration, nor does a voucher system operate 
from the standpoint of voluntary exchange. Therefore, the voucher system 
still employs coercion as a means of administration. Hence, the voucher 
system, like public social welfare administration, is inherently unstable, 
and does not represent a viable alternative to public welfare 
administration.
Actual use of vouchers in the United States is not uncommon, but also 
not very widespread. "Current experience with voucher systems is limited 
largely to federal programs addressing the needs of special groups, such as 
the elderly, veterans, and the poor" (Management Information Service 1984, 
45).
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The second major privatization effort underway in the United States 
is that of contracting-out public services. "The general term contracting 
out refers to the practice of having public services (those which any given 
government unit has decided to provide for its citizens) supplied either by 
other governmental jurisdictions or by private (profit or nonprofit) 
organizations instead of delivering the service through a government unit's 
own personnel" (DeHoog 1984, 3). Contracting-out has been employed to 
improve performance in attaining goals and to cut the cost of providing a 
good or service deemed beneficial to society. Proponents of contracting- 
out "argue that the competitive marketplace produces goods and services 
efficiently, whereas monopolies, whether public or private, tend toward 
both inefficiency and unresponsiveness" (DeHoog 1984, 4). However, the 
mode of contracting-out does not emulate the same process in the private 
sector, involving private transactions. "Competitive bidding is rarely 
involved [when contracting out a public service], but sometimes a number of 
proposals are solicited and reviewed before choosing a firm" (Fisk,
Kiesling and Muller 1978, 62). Therefore, contracting-out has 
traditionally been used as a mode of perpetuating inefficient government 
practices by extending their reach to agencies outside the immediate 
confines of the government.
There is no clear-cut evidence which proves that contracting-out is 
any more efficient than government provision of the same good or service 
despite recent growth in the use of contracting out. "The number of 
purchase agreements [contracts] has increased considerably since the 
passage of the Title IV-A amendment of the Social Security Act in 1967; 
Title IV-A makes it possible for state and local welfare agencies to obtain
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$3 from the federal government for every $1 contributed by a local/state 
agency for contract services.... Funding under Title IV-A between 1967 and 
1975 reached more than $2 billion a year. Approximately 10 percent of 
these funds were spent on contracts with private agencies, while the rest 
went to contracts with government agencies" (Fisk, Kiesling and Muller 
1978, 52).
Contracting-out, since it is not based on free market competition for 
consumer choice, is not based on voluntary exchange between transacting 
parties. While contracting-out is often advocated as a positive move 
toward privatization of the public welfare bureaucracy, in its strictest 
sense it is not any better than the system already in place. For the 
system of contracting-out helps to perpetuate the inefficient structure 
built by the War on Poverty legislation.
There are other forms of privatization being used in the United 
States, including franchising and subsidies, but these methods are more 
often than not used in realms outside poverty relief. Therefore, I will 
not examine their use in this thesis.
Fortunately, traditional privatization efforts toward existing social 
welfare institutions are not the only efforts being made in the face of the 
burgeoning social welfare bureaucracy. "[M]arket-minded political parties 
take a far broader view of welfare, since they regard state provision as 
only one relevant sphere. The radicalism of the political right lies in 
its scope for dismantling state machinery, privatizing state enterprises or 
cutting social services--forms of public-asset stripping that are much 
easier to accomplish under modern economic conditions than the planning of 
national targets that was once the pride of social democratic governments"
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(Jordan 1987, 5).
Two specific examples might serve to show the new movement in 
privatization now underway. These examples are not grounded in traditional 
privatization methods. The first example is actually in place and is 
working successfully. The second is a proposal which incorporates tax 
reform, and will lead to my suggestion for large-scale reform of the public 
welfare system.
The Minneapolis-based Alpha Center for Public/Private Initiatives, 
under the leadership of C. Douglas Ades, promotes the delivery of social 
services using tactics similar to those used by for-profit businesses. 
For-profit businesses seek the minimization of costs as a primary goal of 
doing business. By furnishing information about the resources necessary to 
extend the for-profit approach to social services and providing a brokerage 
function to entrepreneurs needing capital, the Alpha Center has helped 
entrepreneurs, non-profit organizations, grantmakers, corporations, and 
public officials to make inroads into the government welfare monopoly. The 
Alpha Center identifies three resources necessary for this type of 
provision of social services: (1) a central clearinghouse of reliable
information about successful for-profit models, (2) a place for 
entrepreneurs, public officials and others to turn for management 
assistance, and (3) sufficient capital for startup or expansion.
Perhaps the most unique aspect of the Alpha Center is the service it 
provides to non-profit organizations like traditional charities, in which 
these non-profits are moved to the cost minimization approach, based not on 
making profits per se, but on relying on revenues to pay present costs and 
to anticipate future needs. This status gives entrepreneurs and employees
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more of a personal financial stake in the success or failure of the 
enterprise. The Alpha Center provides startup capital for the formation of 
cost-effective service providers, then helps to create positive coalitions 
between these organizations and public-sector officials. Therefore, rather 
than relying on donations, these social service organizations can seek 
investments from entrepreneurs, encouraging such investment on the basis of 
potential subjective profit to the entrepreneur.
The efforts of the Alpha Center help to accelerate the privatization 
of welfare services, unlike vouchers and contracting out, which seek to 
perpetuate public direction of welfare services. The Alpha Center views 
the profit aspect as essential: "We need to create capital at the same
time we're delivering human services--that's the only way we can plug the 
drain on taxes or ease the strain on philanthropy. Profit will enable us 
to expand solutions as quickly as we can to as many American as possible.
If you go back to the idea of creating capital rather than consuming it, 
profit is really a misnomer. It's all just cost. Costs of today and of 
the future, and our present revenues have to cover both."5
The Alpha Center goals include the maintenance of a public/private 
relationship into the future. A reliance upon government standards to 
address equity, quality, and quantity issues as well as government 
monitoring of performance of service providers is indicated. Therefore, 
one can see a maintenance of the public/private dichotomy even within this 
most innovative and free-market oriented privatization movements.
The second example I will examine is that of the voluntarily-directed 
tax. One such "voluntary tax" plan has been proposed by the National 
Center for Policy Analysis, under the leadership of John Goodman. The use
94
of a voluntary tax takes into account the fact that government income 
taxation is not likely to go away in the near future. Proponents of the 
voluntary tax system seek to use income taxation to some advantage other 
than paying the salaries of welfare bureaucrats. "The basic idea...is a 
simple one. Government would continue to force people to give their 'fair 
share' through the vehicle of the income tax system. However, individual 
taxpayers, rather than politicians, would decide how their share of the 
welfare bill would be spent" (Goodman and Stroup 1986, 34). Taxpayers 
could earmark their portion of the welfare bill to any charity that met 
government requirements. "In this way private charities would compete on 
an equal footing with government welfare programs for the portion of the 
federal budget that is allocated to poverty programs" (Goodman and Stroup 
1986, 34). Up to some percentage of each individual's tax burden, for 
every dollar earmarked by the individual for a private charity, one dollar 
would be theoretically be deducted from the public welfare budget.
However, there appears to be no means of policing such a system, especially 
within the boondoggle that is the federal budget.
An even more revolutionary proposal along these lines is what Goodman 
and Stroup (1984, 35) see as a natural extension of the percentage 
allocation by individual taxpayers. This proposal would allow individuals 
to allocate their entire portion of the social welfare budget among all 
public and private sector relief agencies. Essentially, all providers of 
relief services would be in competition with one another for tax dollars.
In 1984, the year this plan was proposed, non-contributory social welfare 
spending totaled $100.5 billion--"an amount equal to about one-third of all 
personal income taxes paid that year....[this proposal] would give
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individuals direct control over how one-third of their tax dollars would be 
spent" (Goodman and Stroup 1984, 35). This is an interesting proposal, and 
is a partial emulation of voluntary exchange, but it still presupposes 
centralized government control and operation as well as confiscatory 
taxation for financing the system.
My own proposal for welfare reform and privatization of social 
welfare administration calls for a complete divorce of the central 
authority from the realm of poverty relief. I do not propose to end 
welfare provision wholesale with the stroke of a pen, but rather to phase­
out centralized provision over a very short period of time, perhaps five 
years or less. During this phase-out period, non-contributory welfare 
programs, including AFDC, food stamps, housing subsidies and the like, 
would be frozen at the level at which they were from the inception of the 
plan. Period. No cost of living increases, nor any automatic increases 
that are built into the legislation would be allowed. A beneficial side- 
effect of this plan would be providing an incentive to the government to 
avoid inflationary monetary and fiscal policies which would erode the real 
value of the frozen welfare provision. As a matter of fact, there would be 
an incentive for legislators to pursue deflationary fiscal and monetary 
policies in order to drive up the value of welfare provision.
During this phase-out period, the portion of the federal budget 
allotted to noncontributory welfare services will be divorced from the 
remainder of the budget. Those federal agencies now administering public 
welfare programs will be required to compete with any private organizations 
providing the same or similar services, with consumers allowed free choice 
of which providers to patronize. As with the above proposal, taxpayers
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will be allowed to allocate the portion of their income tax going to 
welfare to any organization, public or private, providing the same or 
similar services.
The entrenched welfare bureaucracy, however, presents the greatest 
barrier to any phasing-out of federal control. By requiring bureaucrats to 
compete with similar firms, they can be given an incentive to provide 
better services to clients at competitive costs. In order to privatize the 
agencies themselves, the agencies would essentially be sold to the 
bureaucrats and any other interested parties through stock or bond issues, 
with the value of the agency to be based on the value of similar private 
agencies. Those agencies not bought out would have to go out of business, 
thus giving the bureaucrats a powerful incentive to find a way to keep 
their agency in business in order to remain working.
At the end of the phase out period, welfare administration would 
exist only on the market, and would be wholly separate from centralized 
control. Agencies would be forced to encourage contributors to maintain 
contributions or capital investment based on individual decisions. Faced 
with market competition for capital and contributions, agencies would have 
to find ways to minimize costs and outcompete other agencies. In so doing, 
there would be little incentive to keep clients on the dole or to provide 
aid to clients not truly in need. Only a proposal such as this, which 
maintains the supremacy of voluntary transactions, can hope to be 
successful at providing relief to the poor in a free market society.
Such a proposal might appear antithetical to providing for the 
disadvantaged, at least in light of the way poverty has been handled in 
America since the inception of the War on Poverty. However, only a system
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of poverty relief which works under the market mechanism and is based on 
voluntary exchange can hope to achieve success. "The element of risk in 
economic activity and in life must be frankly affirmed. This means 
transcending the mentality of entitlements and guarantees. This is 
required for full participation in this kind of society. Poor people 
should not be deceived into thinking that, in this respect, the society is 
going to be changed. They should rather understand that special provisions 
that make sure they cannot fail also make sure they do not really belong in 
this society" (Nash 1986, 182).
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